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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Intervention by governments in the operation of
economic machinery has been expanding widely in every country
within the past two decades. The ideals of pure laissez-
faire are still adhered to, but in practice laissez-faire has
been as dead as the proverbial duck. In the United States,
for example, we still hold to the ideals of freedom of enter-
prise, economic liberalism, freedom from government inter-
ference, yet we are finding it increasingly difficult to
achieve these ideals. On the contrary we are retrogressing,
so to speak, more and more from them as time passes. Witness
the attempts made by government during the thirties to mitigate
the effects of the depression. N.R.A., relief, home loans,
farm subsidies, tariffs, control of security exchanges, pump
priming and many others. Witness the attempts to avoid the
ill effects of an over expanded economy and yet win the war
in the present emergency. Allover price control, wage control,
priorities, allocations, high taxes. Out of the maze of econ-
omic events there has emerged a definite pattern, a pattern
which indicates that laissez-faire, regardless of the honored
position it has held in the past, is losing its hold. This is
important particularly for the democracies, for in the
democracies these changes represent the will of the people.
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and the people are now realizing that government with a mini-
mum of interference is becoming an impossibility
.
From among the numerous methods of government inter-
ference price fixing is often singled out and Isolated as a
peculiar phenomenon. For purposes of analysis this conception
may have some value, but it is more accurate to view govern-
ment price fixing as part of a broad and extensive movement
which is affecting all phases of economic life. The area of
free competition has been steadily whittled down. Prices
have become increasingly inflexible. This has been partly
due to new controls instituted by governments and partly to
rigidities introduced by industry itself. The nature of
Industrial development, with its emphasis on mass production,
fixed overhead costs, and its concomitant features, organized
labor and rigid wages, has also contributed to the inflexi-
bility. During periods of depression agricultural interests
have viewed with envy the relative stability of industrial
prices, and have agitated for government action to correct
the inequalities. Restrictions in agriculture have been
used by other interests as a lever of bargaining power to
obtain new controls. Thus the pattern which has emerged is
not one of price control only, but rather a pattern of in-
creasing government guidance of economic machinery, in which
price control is only one phase. Much of the expansion of
government activity in economic affairs has taken place in a
haphazard manner without the value of past experience and
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through investigation of consequences. It is our purpose to
evaluate price control in this light. We will look at its
history, analyze it objectively, see how it is working in the
present emergency, but in doing so we will remember that it
is not a peculiar economic phenomonon, but rather one phase
of a general world trend in economic life.
Before proceeding further it will prove helpful if
we define* exactly what we mean by government price fixing.
Government price fixing as we shall consider it in this study
will refer to that action which is deliberately taken by a
national or local government to influence the movement of
price. In the early history of the United States the tariff
was used as a source of revenue. It was an action deliberately
taken by the government and to the extent that it was estab-
lished higher than world price it influenced the movement of
domestic price. However we shall not consider this as govern-
ment price fixing, for the avowed purpose was to raise revenue
and the movement of domestic price was a secondary result of
minor Importance. In the period before World War I the tariff
was used as a means to raise domestic price so as to perpetuate
some of our domestic industry which otherwise would have had
to succumb to world competition. Here was a deliberate action
on the part of the government to raise prices to protect home
industry. In the sense in which we use the term this was
government price fixing. The intent was to increase certain
prices and it was fairly established beforehand that if these
.:
•
.
-
'
.
-
©'I IIlW 0 V7
!
.
'
' O vt • '• v+ <
•
.1
•
.
-
"
• nc .•••'•. ©O-It'OB £ 8£ fcOE^
,
j- rc>
‘
’
•
•
7
l
•
.'<•••
:
oj- a:<£ t'jc : -‘i < t • HiTiovoj ‘o ' •• -
•
. V
'
.
'
•
,
t i i xisrt d dr tr . c.t: .* * e so
'
.
prices were increased certain industry would survive or
certain industry would be fostered.
Price fixing has been adopted to achieve a number
of different purposes. As has been suggested above it may be
used to protect or foster home industry. It may be used to
aid a particular group such as the farmers, or it may be used
to mitigate the effects of a depression or to fight inflation.
In the present emergency it is being used to fight a war. The
attempt is being made to keep prices down so as to avoid a
possible inflation and to keep to a minimum the cost of the
war. At the same time price fixing is being used to increase
production in existing industry and as an aid in the develop-
ment of new industries. The purposes for which it may be
used are numerous and depend largely on the conditions pre-
vailing at a particular time and the results desired. There
are those who hold that price fixing can accomplish no purpose.
They maintain that prices are symptoms reflecting troubled
conditions, and that price fixing merely changes the symptoms
without having any effect on the conditions causing the sym-
ptoms. Let me clarify my stand on this point at the outset.
I must disagree. As we shall see numerous attempts at price
fixing have failed. But examination will reveal that there
are valid reasons for the failure; either faulty economic
reasoning or inefficient and Inadequate administration.
Within limits it is possible for deliberate government action
to influence the movement of prices to accomplish a particular
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purpose. We do not suggest that price fixing is an economic
cure-all, but it does have a large element of value and can
be used wisely or unwisely to accomplish a particular purpose.
The term “price fixing” implies a simple process of
arbitrary price determination. Analysis of the subject matter,
however, reveals that the process is far from simple and the
ramifications almost endless. Arbitrary price fixing is in-
deed one method, but, because of the interdependence of prices
and the dynamics of the economic system, it is in itself
rarely a satisfactory one. More often it is necessary to
control either supply or demand or both. This means pro-
duction controls, surplus controls, tariffs, or rationing,
taxation and forced or voluntary savings. There are a
multitude of devices or mechanisms which must supplement
direct price fixing to make it work. In practice the emphasis
is of necessity more on the indirect means than on the direct.
While we shall examine the direct methods and observe the
economic consequences, our emphasis will be more on the in-
direct methods.
Our analysis will examine objectively the more
important direct and indirect methods of price control. They
are as follows:
I Direct Price Fixing
1. Minimum Price
2. Maximum Price
3 . Range of Prices. (Maximum and minimum are both
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4. Fixed Price Relationship
II Indirect Price Fixing
1. Limitation of Supply
a. Destruction
b. Production control
2. Limitation of Supply In A Particular Market
a. Exports
b. Imports
c. Surplus manipulation
3. Limitation of Demand
a. Rationing
b. Taxation
c. Voluntary or forced savings
Each of these methods will be discussed for the value they
have in themselves and in relation to the broader problems of
price control. After this analysis we shall turn to some of
the present day problems of price control and observe how they
are being met. Many new and far embracing methods have been
developed and they deserve attention.
The purpose of the study should by now be apparent.
We shall attempt to examine the past history of price control,
analyze it objectively, and see how it is working in the
present emergency. We should then be able to evaluate it as
a tool in the broader trend of government interference.
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CHAPTER I
I
MEANING- AND DEVELOPMENT OF PRICE CONTROL
Early Hletory
Government price control is not new. In the tablets
of Hammurabi, King of Babylon, are carved the oldest price
regulations known to man. These laws, cut in stone about
2200 B. C. were extremely rigid. They established minimum
and maximum prices which were absolute and their Jurisdiction
extended to include all Babylonian business. Some of these
laws are listed below:
Compulsory prices, interest, and wage rates—from
the Code of Hammurabi, King of Babylon. 1
If a merchant has loaned grain or money on interest, he
takes for each 8-§- bushels of grain, about 2.83 bushels of
grain as interest: per shekel of silver a sixth plus one-
sixtieth shekel on his interest.
If a builder builds a house for a man and completes it,
that man shall give him two shekels of silver per eighteen
yards of house as his wage.
To surgeons for lucky operations "with a bronze lancet"
:
On full citizens 10 shekels of silver
On freemen 5 shekels of silver
On slaves (to be paid by 2 shekels of silver
owner)
To veterinary physicians for operation on an ox or a
donkey: one sixth of a shekel of silver.
r
1. Hirsch, J., PRICE CONTROL IN THE WAR ECONOMY, Harper &
Bros., New York, 194-3, p. 5.
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Wages for a field laborer 66.6 bushels of grain
(dry measure) annually
Wages for a herdsman 50 bushels of grain
annually
Wages for a tailor 5/360 of a shekel of
silver a day
In the Mosaic and Brahaminic laws are found regula-
tions limiting and regulating the economic life of the people.
There were regulations against false weights and measures and
against adulteration* There were provisions against specula-
tion and monopoly. The Rabinnical law disapproved of raising
market prices by speculative means. In time of famine it
controlled export of food and forbade storing; all must be put
on the market. Along with these ideas was a limitation of
the profit of retail storekeepers to 16-2/3 per cent. 1 The
Brahmanic law also had similar provisions. It penalized
merchants for underselling or for selling an article for more
than it was worth. A theme of economic control pervaded these
laws, but the object was mainly religious, for if one followed
them he gained not only economic well being, but more im-
portant a consciousness of spiritual perfection and of a good
life.
This theme of economic control extended through the
G-reeks and Romans, through the Middle Ages down to about the
beginning of the nineteenth century. In this time fixed
1. Haney, L. H.. HISTORY OF ECONOMIC THOUGHT, Macmillan Co.,
New York, 1940, p. 45.
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prices either determined or influenced all commercial activity
Probably the first over-all price ceiling that was
tried was the edict of Roman Emperor Diocletian in 301 A.D.
1
This decree put an over-all ceiling on wages, prices and rents,
Violations were punishable by the supreme penalty of death,
but despite this severe penalty the system did not last. The
resulting disaster is indicated in the following quotation.
"The results of this edict according to the
historian Lactantius showed the Emperor that no human will
could prevail in matters like these against the force of cir-
cumstances. The dealers, required to sell at a lower price
than they had paid, concealed their commodities; scarcity
increased, street brawls followed in which blood was shed and
2
it became necessary to let the law drop into disuse.
This failure did not prevent the Emperor Julian from attempting
-
a similar experiment sixty years later, with the same results.'
In the life and writings of the Greeks there is
also -Pound evidence of control. Aristotle, in the Politics and
Nicomachian Ethics, expounds his ideas of money and value.
Plato also wrote along similar lines. These discussions were
representative of life of that time for actual business relation-
ships were governed by rules and regulations not unlike those
1. Backman, Jules, GOVERNMENT PRICE FIXING, Pitman Publish-
ing Corporation, New York, 1938, p. 155.
2. Ibid.
, s
3. Ibid.
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of the Hebrews and Hindus. There were, for example, inspectors
of weights and measures, inspectors of goods on 3ale; the
price of salt was regulated and the exportation of wheat was
controlled as was the slaughter of sheep and goats at lambing
time.-1- These controls attempted to substitute for objective
exchange phenomona a subjective concept of valuation which was
to be used as a criterion in economic matters. The attempt was
to place exchange on a high ethical plane.
The ethical concept of price which was developed by
the Greeks continued and was extended in the Middle Ages. The
Church fathers discussed these problems for over a thousand
years. All life was controlled by the Church which promulgated
detailed canons governing almost every phase of life. This
was possible in view of the decentralization and lack of
development. The institutions of independent domestic economy
and competition had not yet emerged so that prices freely
determined by market forces seemed unnatural. The Church
expounded the doctrine of just price ( justium pretium) which
was more natural. Briefly stated the doctrine of just price
was that every article has some price which represents its
value and this price is absolute. It is to be determined and
made objective on the basis of common estimates of the cost
of production.
1. Haney, Op. Cit., p. 59
.;
-
‘
*
i i. G (;•. *\\. r>; l i J jv •. £X:j’T *nC‘0
.
c£* -j d no. - r .7 to (tqer'ftc c . ue£ (ue « '^nomci .r r t . • 0x9
.
.
*
eiw rioJWw qoJ^g; 1o ^qoonoo I- oiJ" • ei 1'
•
r
'
.
’
.' ••
i . :
• vr ;• J
'
e vc Jr cmlz r- rTim©vos snoiuec
o weJtv ni ofdieeoq bjef
.
Jjar J o r £ea**?>iBe S:v ^on £>J3ff noi;' * qaoo f>nfi
.
•-
.\ : J< . ."! Jo fr
*,
. > , • 9f o im/oqX9
,
_
i c.
.
«o.() 6 o t<. r.3^* .. C 1C -• * 0 lc:*d UtJ . 6\ UO' . - " ’»£.•
— — —
. . . .
11
On the subject of interest the Church fathers were
particularly effusive. They devoted a large part of their
discussions to the question of whether interest can be con-
sidered a Just cost. As late as 1311 it was declared illegal
on the belief that to take interest for a loan of money was
like charging more than the Just price. In the words of 3t.
Thomas Aquinas, the most noted of the schoolastics, "To take
usury for a loan of money is in itself unjust; for it is to
sell what does not exist, which is an inequality, and, there-
fore, an injustice." This strict control of life by the
church was possible only in an undeveloped society. As the
world emerged from the Middle Ages and aa the institutions
of an exchange economy developed, this control waned and the
Church gradually had to alter its canonical law to conform to
actual conditions. Loans at interest were recognized under
certain conditions and these conditions were slowly modified
until they finally conformed to the general practice.
From the Middle Ages to the period of the American
and French Revolutions, the Guild System prevailed in most
countries. It had as its background a rigid system of control
of wages and prices. The guild was the central unit in this
system. It was an organization of all the population of the
town who engaged in the business of selling. The principal
*
reason for its existence was to preserve to its members
monopoly of trade. ^ No one not in the guild of the town
1. It also maintained quality at a high level
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12
could buy or sell there except under conditions imposed by the
guild. There were regulations defining the difference in
position between the master, journeyman and apprentice. Wages
and hours of labor were regulated. There were rules of sale
which prohibited cornering of the market. 1 The organization
was one of strict control and though it passed through
several stages merchant, crafts, and non-industrial, the
factor of control was dominant. With the dawn of the
renaissance the power of the guild passed to the town and
finally to the national state.
As the church influence waned and as the national
states emerged, there grew in the minds of men certain
economic ideas which are lossely called mercantilis tic . As
a doctrine Mercantilism was first systematically developed
by an Italian writer, Serra in 1613. His ideas were grasped
and developed to their fullest extent by the English writers,
particularly William Petty, Sir Jodiah Child, Thomas Mun,
and it was the English who adopted these mercantilist
practices into their economy and utilized them to the fullest
extent. The chief purpose of Mercantilism was to make the
state strong. The economic basis of strength was wealth
which consisted mainly of the precious metals gold and
silver which were referred to as treasure* . The means
1. Cheyney, E.P., INDUSTRIAL AND SOCIAL HISTORY OF ENGLAND,
Macmillan Co., New York, 1923, pp. 30-62.
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adopted to secure the desired treasure was that of ’ forraign
trade’, the idea being that no matter how great a nation's
foreign trade might be, it was of no value unless there was a
considerable excess of exports over imports so that the
precious metals would flow into the country. Various measures
of control had to be invoked in order to carry out this plan.
There was strict control over exports and imports and manu-
facturing was encouraged over agriculture. There were laws
which aided the utilization of waste lands so that those
things then imported might be produced at home. By 'corn
laws’ which prohibited the importation of grain when the
price at home fell below a certain level, it was hoped that
agriculture would be stimulated so that the nations would
become self-sufficient and support a large population. Con-
trol by the state of economic matters was practiced, but it
was more of a social planning than strict control over
production and prices. Although industry was regulated for
the purpose of extending foreign trade, it may be truly said
that there was more freedom in economic life during this
period than at any other time to this point.
With the passing of the Mercantilist era the world
entered into a period of laissez-faire, a period where con-
trol of entrepreneurial life was practically nil. 1 All price
1. Control of entrepreneurs. Labor was regulated more
strictly than heretofore.
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fixing and price control were abolished and other obstacles
to employer economic freedom were curtailed. The free price
became the natural regulating force in all business activity
and the ultimate consumer and his purchasing power determined
what goods and services were to be produced and in what
quantities. This was basically the system expounded by Adam
Smith in his "Wealth of Nations" and it was under a similar
economy that great strides in economic evolution were made.
It was during this era that governments declared their
determination to abstain from interference with prices and
most of them honestly tried to do so. There were exceptions
of course, but the important thing to note is that free
competition, free prices and free markets made during this
period of approximately 150 years a definite contribution to
economic progress and to the development of higher living
standards.
There are several isolated examples of control which
should be mentioned. An attempt to fix prices was made during
the French Revolution in the 1790's and despite the liberal
use of the guillotine this failed. In 1777 Mass, attempted
to fix prices of commodities and labor; but it found the
problems of enforcement so great that it had to repeal the
law the same year. Pennsylvania also attempted a similar
expenhent about the same time which was also unsuccessful
1. Backman, Op* Cit., p. 156
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Throughout history until comparatively recent
times control of one sort or another has been the dominant
motif. With the advent of the era of laissez-faire price
fixing and control dropped into temporary oblivion.
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CHAPTER III
CONTROL THROUGH VALORIZATION AND GOVERNMENT AGREEMENT
With the dawn of the twentieth century price control
was once again drawn from the economist's bag of tricks and
applied to a degree unparalleled in previous history. It
was about this time that the effect of the rapid increase
in the arts through new invention began to level off.
Economically the development of the world had reached a
plateau stage and economic frictions had arisen which made
impossible a smooth operation of the laissez-faire economy.
In order to facilitate the function of the free system various
schemes of control were adopted and applied, some by govern-
ments and some by individuals. These schemes on the whole
resulted in failure, but we examine them that we may learn from
the lessons of the past something which will be of aid to us
in formulating the policies of the future, for it is evident
to us now, in view of recent world history, that price fixing
and control in one form or another is going to be with us for
some time to come and regardless of the merits pro or con we
must learn the intricacies of the different methods so that
we may be able to attain a reasonable degree of smoothness
in application.
The schemes of price fixing fall into two broad
classifications, those commonly referred to as valorizations
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and those which are accomplished through agreements between
governments. We shall examine the most important of those
schemes which have been utilized,
Valori zations
All price fixing experiments are commonly referred
to as valorizations; actually the term applies to a particular
type of price fixing. Technically valorizations attempt to
control the supply of a commodity, eliminating temporary
excesses which would depress prices below their normal long
run level or using surpluses accumulated in time of aDundance
to offset a new scarcity which might cause an excessive rise
in price. The primary purpose is not to fix a definite price
and then to maintain it, but rather to apply measures of
control on production so that excessive fluctuation of prices
may be eliminated. In the words of the Federal Farm Board;
"Not stabilization in the sense of rigid fixation or leveling
of prices, but stabilizing in the sense of limiting fluctua-
tions and cushioning the shocks from severe fluctuations," 1
Valorization operations may attempt to control the
flow of a commodity for a short period of time or they may
operate to regulate the supply for a long period of time. The
more significant type is the long run type, that which is con-
cerned with smoothing out the effects of irregular production
1, First Annual Report of Federal Farm Board, p. 24,
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over a period of time. This type is usually applied to agrlcul
ture so that the effects of irregular crops resulting from vary
ing weather conditions over a period of years may be stabilized
The problems in agriculture are great, for once the crop is
planted the results depend to a very large extent on outside
forces* For example in a program of curtailment, good weather
may result in a larger crop than anticipated thus counter-
balancing the decrease in acreage planted, or in a program of
expansion bad weather may curtail an anticipated bumper crop.
When applied to manufacturing the problems, are not by com-
parison as great, since it is relatively easy to control the
number of units produced.
Valorizations are not uncommon; many experiments
have been attempted. In order to simplify our discussion we
shall limit ourselves to three of the most well known situation^,
Brazilian coffee, Japanese silk, and the United States Federal
Farm Board.
1. Brazilian Coffee. The Incentives for the control
of coffee in Brazil are to be found in the conditions of demand
to which coffee is subject and the important part it plays in
the economy of that country. Coffee, not unlike many other
of nature's products, is subject to conditions of Inelastic
demand. Elasticity of demand is a measure of the change of
amounts purchased in response to a change in price. Inelastic
demand means that a sharp decline or rise in price is not
accompanied by significant increase or decrease in the amounts
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taken. The following graphic Illustration will make this
clear.
1
It can be seen that with decreases in the price the total
amount spent is decreasing, or to put it another way, if there
is a sudden increase in the amounts offered as there would
be in the case of a bumper crop, then the drop in price will
be so great that the net amount of income to the producers
would be less. Thus in case of an abnormally large crop it is
practically impossible for the producer to dispose of his
crop at a reasonable price. Over a period of years the ex-
perience in Brazil was that the large crop so absorbed the
vitality of the soil that it was followed by several years of
1, For the mathematical reader. The elasticity of demand is
the rate of change of the demand curve at any given point.
If the demand curve is y = f (x) then the elasticity is
f
•
(x) and the marginal demand will be y s f'(x).
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average yield and there arose a desire among the producers for
some medium which would absorb the excess crop in the abundant
year and gradually release it during the less abundant years
thereby eliminating the disastrous effects of sharp fluctuation
in price.
The coffee experiments attempted in Brazil extended
Intermittently from 1906-1938. The first scheme was adminis-
tered hy a committee of the state of Sao Paulo. The control
was featured by several methods of which valorization opera-
tions was the most Important. The entire crop was purchased
from the planters by the committee which had financial backing
from the government. This financial backing did not prove to b
adequate and a loan had to be negotiated from the British and
French bankers. As a condition of the loan no additional pur-
chases were to be made and the existing stocks were to be
liquidated. The situation brought about by the World War
eased conditions to the extent that surpluses were liqui-
dated so that principal and Interest on the loan were paid and
several million dollars actually accrued to the Brazilian
treasury.
e
A second valorization became necessary when in 1917-
18 large crops combined with difficult shipping conditions
accumulated large stocks. However, adverse weather in the
next two years created short crops and allowed the government
to liquidate its holdings profitably. In 1922 because of the
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paralysis brought on by the post war depression the government
again intervened and purchased surplus stocks with the lntentlo
to liquidate them over a period of ten years. However, fortune
again favored the Sao Paulo government and the entire surplus
was liquidated by the end of 1923*
The fourth coffee valorization started in 1924, The
agency which handled the control was initially the Institute
for the Permanent Defense of Coffee, later reorganized as the
Sao Paulo Coffee Institute, Through the reorganization com-
plete political control was obtained by the government,! The
methods used consisted of a control of exports, regulation of
shipments from the interior to the ports of exportation, pur-
chases in the open market when necessary, and loans to
planters against coffee in the official warehouses. In order
to control marketing of the coffee the government made the
planters ship their coffee to official warehouses from which
their disposal was completely controlled ty the government.
In order to prevent evasion by the planters, the railroads
were allowed to ship coffee only from the warehouses. The
funds to finance the scheme were obtained through a tax on the
export trade, a tax on the coffee carried by the railroads
and the sale of bonds through foreign channels. From 1926
through 193° It was necessary to raise over 35 million lbs,
through foreign bankers and the situation became so bad that
1, Backman, Jules, ADVENTURES IN PRICE FIXING, Farrar & Rine-
hart, New York, 1936, p, 20,
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a policy of destruction had to be adopted in an attempt to
alleviate the situation* During the first year the destruction
was executed at the rate of a million bags a month*
1
By 193^
more than 60 million bags or the equivalent of two and one
half years consumption had been destroyed. ^ The final down-
fall of the scheme was due to a tremendous Increase in the
supply of coffee which was brought on by two bumper crops in
three years and to an overextended financial condition*
Brazilian experiments furnish excellent illustration of the
futility of trying to control price over a long period of time
without rigid control of production.
3
2* Control of Silk in Japan* On numerous occasions
the Japanese government has attempted to Interfere with the
free price of silk* Prior to 1930 there were two experiments
which were mildly successful but which, had conditions been
different, might have failed miserably. The first attempt was
made in 1915 when the Imperial Raw Silk Co*, Limited, other-
wise known as Teisen Kaisha, financed by government funds
began to buy up excess stocks of silk which were depressing
the market price. The government entered the scheme half-
heartedly and when the limited funds of the company were used
up it refused to advance additional aid so that it became
necessary to dissolve the company. At that time approximately
1. Backman, ADVENTURES IN PRICE FIXING, Op. Cit., p. 105*
2. Ibid., p. 106.
3* Rowe, J.W., MARKETS AND MEN, Macmillan Co., New York, 1936*
PD. 22-50.
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12000 bales had been bought up, approximately one third less
than the available stock. The company was faced with a hope-
less situation, but fortunately for it the war boom Intervened
and it was possible to liquidate the stocks profitably.
In the post-war depression of 1920-21 the price of
silk again collapsed. Again loans were made from the govern-
ment by a company organized for that purpose and the excess
silk was removed from the market. The depression, however, was
short lived and the stocks liquidated within a short time. In
both of these experiments the degree of dependence on foreign
markets was shown, particularly the American market, for when
conditions in the American market improved it no longer was
necessary to control the Japanese market and previously pur-
chased stocks were absorbed without difficulty.
By 1930 the effects of the depression in this country
had been reflected in the Japanese market and the price of
silk had dropped extremely low. Control was again deemed ex-
pedient and a similar plan was put into effect, except that the
new plan had Incorporated in it an attempt to limit the produc-
tion of silk. The production curtailment program was enforced
by local provincial magistrates who fearing loss of political
power in their districts failed to carry out the program. By
1938 many of the snags had been ironed out and production
curtailment was working as planned.
In spite of the production curtailment program the
plan was not successful from a valorization point of view,
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although from the point of view of waging a long war, the plan
might be considered successful. This is Indicated by the fact
that raw silk prices reached a low point in 1934 and 1935
when at this time prices of other commodities had begun to
show increases. The failure of the curtailment program to get
a quick start caused huge accumulations of silk by the govern-
ment so that by 1937 the silk industry was largely in govern-
ment hands and its future entirely dependent on political
developments*
3# Federal Farm Board. One of the outstanding
adventures in price fixing in the United States was the Federal
Farm Board experiment between 1929 and 1932* The Federal Farm
Board had at its disposal the largest fund with which to con-
trol prices that has ever been placed in the hands of a price
control authority, a fund of five hundred million dollars
which was to be used primarily to support the wheat and cotton
markets* The main objective of the Farm Board was to stabil-
ize market fluctuations but it had a secondary purpose, namely
to encourage and promote farmer* s cooperative associations*
In its attempt to control cotton prices the Farm
\
Board used two methods. It made loans to cooperatives so
that cotton could be marketed at the proper time and it
engaged in open market purchases. The theory behind the loan
type of control was that loans made to the farmers through the
cooperatives would increase their holding power so that they
could withhold surplus stocks from the market during the
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period of depressed price and release them laxer in an orderly-
fashion at higher prices* To do this loan values had to be
determined for the surplus stocks held as collateral, and these
loan values were usually slightly below the market price* They
were, however, not sufficiently below the market price and
when the price declined pressure was put on the government
to take over the cotton* This the Farm Board did and as a
result the government was left literally holding the bag*
Although the Farm Board could have engaged in extensive open
market operations, it did not do so. Many people believed that
the board supported the market lay making huge purchases and to
the extent that this information was believed it helped in a
psychological way to maintain the price* Actually, of the
total of approximately 3 , 500,000 bales held at the peak of the
control only
~f&,300 bales were acquired in open market purchases.
By 1930 cotton cooperatives were withholding large
amounts of cotton from the market by virtue of the loan policy
of the Farm Board. In the first few months of the year the
market price sagged to a point lower than the loan value,
which was then about 16 cents per pound, and the position of
the cooperatives became so bad that there was complete
demoralization of prices* The handling of cooperative supplies
was then turned over to the American Cotton Cooperative Associa-
tion and finally to the Cotton Stabilization Corporation which
1. Federal Farm Board, First Annual Report, p, 39 .
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was formed by the government in June 1930 ease the situatlo;
By January 1931 the holdings of the Cotton Stabilization
Corporation amounted to over 2 billion bales and though there
was no increase during that year, such large holdings con-
stituted a threat to the market and some means had to be
found to liquidate them* In August of 1932 the first sales
were made, and within a year, after donating about #50,000
bales to the Red Cross for which no remuneration was received,
and after allowing farmers to buy up large amounts in return
for promises to plow up equivalent amounts of their 1933 crop,
the holdings were finally liquidated*
1
The cotton experiment unfortunately was doomed to
failure at its inception* Although the Farm Board had
sufficient financial resources, there were no rigid provisions
in the act of Congress for production curtailment and there
was thus a steady Increase in production* The Board did
attempt to secure voluntary curtailment “by means of radio
addresses, letters and other forms of publicity” but such
means proved inadequate* One of the unfortunate results of
the experiment was that with interference, the price in the
domestic market was higher than that in foreign markets
resulting in a decline of forty five per cent in the propor-
tion of American cotton used in foreign countries* 2
1* The A.A.A. which was formed in May 1933, handled the op-
tions offered to the farmers. Under these options the
cotton was sold at 6 cents per pound and since the market
price was then 9 cents it was profitable to take up the
options.
2. Backman f Op~ Clt^ t p ~ ilk*
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One of the basic lessons learned from valorization
schemes is that control of prices without rigid control of
production in the long run is impossible. When there occurs
a price level higher than normal because of Interference with
the free movement by some outside force, it then becomes ad-
vantageous to the individual producer in a competitive market
to increase his production Inasmuch as he feels that he will
be able to sell all he produces at the market price. When the
price is higher than normal the incentive to produce is great
and the need of control is naturally greater. The means of
control must then be rigid so that there will be as nearly as
possible, absolute control of the new supply coming into the
market. In the absence of restrictive measures valorization
must depend on adverse weather conditions to accomplish the
necessary decrease in supply.
The problems of administration of valorizations are
naturally many. There has been a tendency to Ignore wise
business practice and unnecessary losses have resulted. Loan
values have set unnecessarily high. Imprudent methods of
storage have incurred huge charges for storage, insurance and
deterioration. These are problems which can and must be ironed
out if valorization schemes are to be used with any success.
Control by Government Agreement
Control of prices by international means may be
divided roughly into two broad categories; those between
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producers in different countries and those between the govern-
ments of different countries. The former usually take the form
of cartels which divide markets, determine policies of price and
conditions of sale. Cartels are older than government agree-
ment, the latter representing a comparatively recent develop-
ment, Actually they are outside the scope of our discussion,
but they are mentioned in view of the effect they have had in
a war economy and the extent to which they have influenced
recent price policy.
There have been comparatively few intergovernmental
agreements to control price either directly or Indirectly.
This type of control has been the result of world trade
depression and it has been applied in those industries where
the dislocations were rempant even before the depression. The
World War I was perhaps the greatest single factor contribut-
ing to dislocation. 1 The belligerents in their desire to con-
clude hostilities as quickly as possible created tremendous
capacity to produce and in the postwar era this capacity far
exceeded the power to absorb. The general cry was for pro-
tective tariff and economic self-sufficiency and the pro-
ponents of these measures were strong enough to put them into
effect. The channels of world trade became glutted resulting
in the accumulation of tremendous surpluses in some countries.
Control of production and price became not desirable but *
necessary to ease this condition.
1
. Rowe discussion, Op. Cit., p. 171-172.
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International agreement to control world supply has
been used in tin, rubber, sugar, wheat, and tea. For the pur-
pose of our discussion we shall examine the controls of the
first three commodities mentioned; namely, The International
Tin Agreement, The International Rubber Agreement, and the
Chadbourne Sugar Plan.
1. International Tin Agreement. The study of the
control of tin is of very special Interest because the scheme
resulted in a fair degree of success. In the first few years
of operation the price of tin doubled and it was maintained, to
the outbreak of present hostilities, at a level more profitable
than would have existed had the industry operated at full
capacity without control.
One of the reasons for the need of control of tin
arises from the nature of the demand. It is used mainly in
the manufacture of automobiles and airplanes and it is used in
small quantities in association with other metals. 1 The demand
is limited and therefore becomes economically Inelastic. If
production is only slightly in excess of requirements, the
price will fall severely because consumption cannot be increased
as the price falls. Another contributing factor is that tin is
so valuable that accumulation of stocks is very costly, thus a
fall in price is not arrested by buying for stock holding. On
1. The development of magnesium as a substitute for tin during
the war will have great effect in the postwar era.
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the production side it should he noted that seventy two percent
of the world supply is located in Malaya, Bolivia and Nether-
land East Indies1 and thus the industry is an important factor
in the economies of these countries*
The first instance of intervention was started in
1920 when the Bandoeng Pool was formed by the Malayan and
Netherland East Indies governments to absorb the excess stocks
which had accumulated during the war due to shortage of ship-
ping facilities. This pool was liquidated profitably in 1925*
The seeds of the recent restriction scheme are found in the
attempts of certain large producers to restrict output by
voluntary agreement. In 1929 these producers, representing
about one quarter of the world supply organized the Tin
Producers* Association and obtained the agreement of about
three quarters of the industry to cooperate in curtailment.
Many producers failed to keep their promises and when supplies
became excessive pressure was brought to bear upon the respect-
ive governments to make the restriction compulsory. In March
1931 the restriction scheme by government agreement was
started.
The original participants in the control were
British Malaya, Bolivia, Netherland East Indies and Nigeria.
Other of the less important producing countries were invited
1. Spiegel, H. W., ECONOMICS OF TOTAL WAR, Appleton-Century
Co., London, 19^2.
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to participate on favorable terms. The primary object at that
time was to prevent any further uncontrolled expansion# The
mechanism of control provided for a standard quota for each of
the participants based upon the production in the base year
1929# Every three months the International Tin Committee, com-
posed of representatives from the signatory governments, was
to examine the ratio of production to consumption and issue
suggestions to each government for quota revisions. The
original quotas were set at seventy eight per cent of the 1929
production, but because the price did not rise and stocks did
not fall as rapidly as planned the degree of restriction had to
be increased. In August 1931 special problem of surplus
stocks was attacked by the formation of a private pool which
purchased the excess stocks and cleared the market, 1 By July
1932 production was restricted to one third of the 1929 output.
A gradual increase in American demand allowed for gradual in-
creases, By 1937 when the agreement was renewed, quotas were
set at 100$ and were Increased to 110$ for the last nine months
of the year. The pool was in operation at the outbreak of
present hostilities. Because of war conditions information on
operations up to the time of Japanese domination is not avail-
able.
There seems to be little doubt that the primary
1. This pool worked in close cooperation with the International
Tin Committee and within a short time the stocks were liqui-
dated. The primary purpose of the pool to reduce pressure
of existing stocks on prices was accomplished.
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purpose of the scheme, namely to raise the price In world mar-
ket to a profitable level, was achieved. When the scheme was
first started tin was selling at 122 pounds per ton. After a
series of wide fluctuations the price rose until it reached
150 pounds in the last half of 1932, The stimulus of increased
consumption in the United States and the rearmament boom forced
the price to J>00 pounds by March 1937* The business recession
in the United States brought a drop to 173 pounds per ton in
the early part of 193*> from which there was a gradual Increase
brought on by the impending outbreak of hostilities. It is
thus evident that the control has achieved the desired goal of
a price sufficient to allow profitable operations. Most pro-
ducers agree that at a price of 200 pounds all can operate at
a profit. A more important question which has been raised is
whether or not the control has not gone beyond its goal of
achieving profitable price and is not exacting an unreasonable
tribute from the consumer.
Discussion of the control of tin is not complete
without mention of the conflict between high cost and low cost
producers. It is contended that the turden of restriction
falls on the low cost group, for when the price is increased
by restriction quotas the hi$i cost producers are able to
operate and additional supply is brought into the market which
would not be available were the price lower. When quotas
were fixed at high levels difficulty from this source was kept
at a minimum due to the prevalent feeling among low cost
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producers that they could take away the market from their
competitors at any time if they so desired. When production
control was necessary and restriction quotas were lowered the
cries of complaint were heard, for it was then that the low
cost producers felt that their production was limited more than
necessary* Many threatened to secede from the control plan,
but up until the time of outbreak of hostilities the situation
was kept well in hand*
2. International Control of Rubber. Since the World
War rubber has been subject to either voluntary or compulsory
control* The industry is comparatively young. Its growth
parallels that of the automobile industry which has been its
chief user. Prior to 1900 most rubber came from the Amazon
valley or from Central Africa where the trees grew wild and
expeditions had to be organized to travel around and tap them.
1
Around 1900 commercial plantings were begun in Malaya and were
extended to Java and Ceylon. Up until the outbreak of World
War I the industry grew steadily with tremendous acreage
planted and the price, though fluctuating sharply at times,
fairly profitable. During the War the great trouble in the
industry was with shipping* In 1917 rubber was selling in
Singapore at half the price it was bringing in London simply
because shipping facilities were not available.- Stocks were
1. Rowe, Op. Clt., p. I32 .
2. Ibid.
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piled up in Malaya and a voluntary restriction scheme had to
be introduced* As shipping became available stocks were moved
out and the plan was abandoned* However, in 1920 came the
post-war business slump in the United States which was at that
time using about two thirds of the world production. Voluntary
restriction was again tried under the auspices of the Rubber
Growers Association of London, but the opposition from some of
the members of the association was so great that it became
necessary for the British Government to intervene. Too much
British capital had been invested and the industry had reached
too high a level of economic Importance to Malaya and Ceylon
for the government to overlook the situation* The famous
Stevenson Committee was appointed and made a survey of condi-
tions the results of which were presented in its report of
May 1922. In this report the Committee advised that no
restriction scheme could be effective without the cooperation
of the Dutch, but when the Dutch refused to enter the plan
the Committee reconsidered and recommended the establishment
of a scheme by the British alone*
The essence of the Stevenson Plan was control of
exports from Malaya and Ceylon. A standard tonnage was deter-
mined for each grower based on the 1919-1920 production and
• \
quotas were set up on this standard. The initial restriction
was sixty percent and as soon as the plan was released there
was an Immediate increase in price. For the first few years
the plan operated successfully. At the end of 1924, however
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there was a sudden increase in consumption in the United States
which drove the price to over 4s by November 1925* The re-
sult of course, was large increase in the exports of those
countries outside the scheme especially the Netherlands East
Indies. In the United States public sentiment was aroused and
successful attempts were made at conservation and the use of
reclaimed rubber. By October, 1926, the effects of these
developments were fully reflected in a long time low price of
Is. 9d* Further quota changes were made, but by that time it
was apparent to the British government that they could not
carry on the scheme alone as they did not control enough of
the market to control the price without losing their propor-
tionate share of world rubber business. The plan was abandoned
on November 1, 192S.
The business depression of 193° presented new problems
common to both British and Dutch and an attempt was made by a
group of British and Dutch producers to voluntarily restrict
their outputs. This attempt failed and though the governments
of the respective countries were hesitant to interfere and
understanding was finally reached in April, 1934, for an
international restriction scheme. This understanding included
the English, French and Netherlands governments.
The new plan, like the Stevenson plan embodied a
control over exports. However unlike the Stevenson plan it
Included the entire industry and controlled not only exports
but planting and replanting. The mechanism for changing
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quotas was also more flexible,
1
The basic tonnage on which
quotas were based was determined by potential production rather
than past production, end allowance was made for trees which
were not yet productive. There was also provision for change
in basic quotas if this became necessary . The entire quota
system was very flexible and this proved later on to be an
important asset to the plan. Control of the quota system was
vested in the International Rubber Regulation Committee,
When the control started in 1934 there were monthly
reductions from 100 percent of basic tonnage to 7° percent from
June to December. During the next two years the percentages
varied from sixty five to seventy five according to market
conditions. A slump in consumption in the United States led
to reductions to sixty and then to forty five percent by the
end of 193&* By 1940 war conditions had caused increases to
ninety percent and one hundred percent for the first three
quarters of 1941 and one hundred twenty percent for the last
quarter. ^ The plan was in operation up until the time of
Japanese conquest of the rubber producing areas in the early
part of 1942.
As measured hy price, the control achieved a sub-
stantial success. Since the inception of the scheme there has
1. The Stevenson plan provided for quota changes once every
three months and limited these changes to five or ten per-
cent a month. There was not sufficient flexibility to
correct quickly maladjustments between supply and demand.
2. Spiegel, Op. Cit., p. 264.
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been a gradual increase in price. At times the price was high
enough to stimulate the use of reclaimed rubber, but the
flexibility in the quota system allowed changes to be made to
overcome this. In 193& the Committee was criticised for fail-
ure to adjust quotas at the proper time. There was reflected
at this time a vital factor inherent in all such schemes,
the human element. This factor has been the cause for the
failure of many schemes of control. On the whole, however,
the plan has worked out well. The Committee has exercised a
liberal price policy and has been interested in stabilization
of prices rather than in the exaction of high prices from the
consumer. It has administered successfully a scheme of control
by utilizing the lessons of previous attempts and overcoming
their pitfalls.
3 . The Chadbourne Sugar Plan. During World War I
there was a severe shortage of sugar in all countries. Cuba
was the only country where sugar production could be expanded
to meet this deficiency thus there was an enormous amount of
new planting of hitherto uncultivated land. Except for a short
period of depression after the war Cuba enjoyed a period of
prosperity which extended into the middle twenties. In the
1924-25 season the production of sugar jumped up tremendously
and though consumption was increasing it could not keep pace
with the sudden increase in production. About this time Cuba
introduced her first restriction scheme which included a
severe production control program. As Cuba reduced her pro-
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ductlon her competitors, benefiting by a price which would
have been lower had the Cuban production not been restricted
expanded their production so that the only result was a
substantial decline in Cuba’s share in the world market.
Disgust with the results of the scheme resulted in abandonment
at the end of 1928. Good crops in the 1929 season forced the
price down and the decreased importation by the United States
after the stock market crash brought increased supplies of
sugar on the world market. The desire for control was manifest
at this time. Cuba, with its recent unsatisfactory experience,
was not willing to repeat its mistakes and hence sought the
cooperation of other exporting countries. Under the stimulus
of decreased consumption and increasing stocks an agreement
was reached in May William L. Chadbourne, an American,
was instrumental in bringing about the agreement, hence the
plan bears his name.
The participants included Cuba, Java, Germany,
Poland, Hungary, Belgium, Czechoslovakia, Peru, and Jugoslavia.
The purpose of the agreement was twofold; to raise the price to
a profitable level and to distribute without repercussion the
excess inventories. The method of control consisted of a
system of export quotas supplemented by control of production.
Problems of production made it necessary for each country to
adopt its own method of control. Cuba established quotas
within the country and in addition levied a heavy tax on the
output of new mills constructed during the life of the scheme.
• < i • 3 i ; '
'*
‘ J { ;
'
I
:
<
..
'
'J. •' > x
*
.I
-
: .a • * A.
-
lfc
• -
•
-
-
-
" J
..
'•
~ :
...
. o
;
.
. 1 .
t >
,
:
•
-
'
'o \6 sxn t ot>
r
-
: l f! ‘ r : ; .
t
:
•
,
.
-
' r
*
V •
'
-
•
,
: * 11 • ^ •: •*. • A. lii Xic ; i: .Liiri> •;
l
.
« . t <• <
r
-
'
.
; •
• • sS
- t - • t
*
‘
•
.
-
. .
> , ,
. « j
ii - : J 1 ;•i • ”f - fiti A -
-
.i . •
. :
.
•
•
: I'. J L .
V J
I » ,, l;U r
•
-
.
; iii io .
. :i ,
. c
Java used a system of export licenses with heavy fines for
evasion. Similar action was taken hy the other participants.
The sharp decline in production of the participating countries
Indicates that production control was effective.
The plan was under the jurisdiction of the Inter-
national Sugar Council with large voting power in the hands of
Cuba and Java who were the leading producers. Provision was
made for automatic Increase in export quotas if the price
advanced beyond certain levels. The provision, however,
provided only for automatic increases upward and when down-
ward revision was required it was necessary to secure the
approval of every participating member. This made the adjust-
ment of supply inflexible and the bickering and discussion
resulted in tardy adjustments of quotas which occasioned dis-
putes between Cuba and Java.
Unfortunately the scheme did not work out as Intended
When the scheme was instituted the participating countries rep-
resented about ninety percent of world production and with so
large a proportion of the world market under their control they
felt relatively safe in adopting the scheme. However, other
factors intervened which tended to upset their plans. The
chief cause was the desire of the consuming countries to
achieve national self sufficiency particularly with respect to
sugar. Tariff walls were erected and bounties paid to en-
courage home production and reduce dependence on outside
3!
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Thus despite a successful restriction program prices
drifted lower and lower. After four years of restriction the
chief results that could he reported were a sharp decline in
production and a diminished control of world markets. The
sharper proportionate decrease in the output of Java by com-
parison to the outputs of other participants made the producers
of that country dissatisfied wi^h the plan and unwilling to
participate in the renewal. With lower prices and heavier
inventories neither of the objectives was achieved and the
plan was discontinued at the expiration of the agreement in
September 1935 *
Controls by government agreement have represented a
depression phenomona. Decrease in consumption, excess produc-
tion, and low prices, the results of the dislocations arising
from World War I, have resulted in the desire to control
markets by Joint cooperation. The attempts at control have
been fostered by political and economic conditions, particular-
ly by the desire of many important countries to become self
sufficient. This desire has led to tariffs and subsidies to
encourage domestic production. The ensuing frictions glutted
the channels of world trade causing contraction for exporting
countries, and general breakdown. Restriction was the only
apparent solution.
>
1, In England Consumers paid three times as much for home
sugar as they could have bought it for on the world market,
Rowe, MARKETS AND MEN, Chap, IV.
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The schemes discussed have used relatively uniform
methods. They indicate that control of supply within each
country can be reasonably achieved and that effective control
over supply in world markets is possible. Control over price
on the other hand has not been similarly effective. Despite
restriction controls there has been wide fluctuation of prices
due for the most part from Inability to forecast correctly
what the consumption will be. This inability has led to fail-
ure to restrict supply sufficiently or to delay in regulating
quotas when consumption is changing rapidly. It constitutes
the human factor which is so important in agreements of this
type.
One of the most costly lessons that has been learned
from these agreements is that control over the entire supply is
prerequisite if a good part of the market is not to be lost to
competing producers. Control of supply must include all pro-
ducing countries whether or not they export and if necessary
liberal allowances must be made to the smaller countries as an
Inducement for their cooperation. When complete control is not
accomplished the Inducement to those producers outside the
control to increase their production and take advantage of a
higher than normal price is great and too often results in
breakdown of the control scheme.
Most intergovernmental agreements are formulated to
help the producer and have little consideration for the con-
sumer. Some agreements have contained provision for consumer
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representation but these representatives may act only in an
advisory capacity. However, the problem of consumer exploita-
tion is very important. The high price maintained by the tin
and rubber schemes Indicate that it is not to be overlooked,
Backman suggests that “consumers should be allowed to help
determine policy and should be permitted to vote on subsequent
changes. They should insist upon a price determined by
approximate costs of production including a fair profit and
then make certain that the control authorities do not force
prices substantially above that level," 1 The suggestion is
very pertinent. Exploitation can be harmful not only to the
consumer but to the producer. In the long run any action
which prevents unreasonable prices should be welcome by
restricting countries.
1 , Backman, GOVERNMENT PRICE FIXING, p. I52,
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CHAPTER IV
» PRICE FIXING IN THE UNITED STATES
No other nation is as fervent an adherent to the
ideals of free markets, free prices, and free enterprise as is
the United States, Yet several times in our recent history-
conditions have come about which have necessitated the tem-
porary shelving of these ideals. We have lived through two
world wars and an intervening depression and have had to resort
to artificial xievlces to help along our economic system.
Through all this we are still strong adherents of the free
economy, but it is now becoming apparent that our ideals are
going through a period of change. Our concept of a free
economy in which control of any sort is taboo is developing
to the point where we recognize that certain man-made devices
are necessary to help our economy along and that a relatively
free economy which allows freedom of enterprise and individual
initiative can only be maintained through the aid of artificial
controls. We have seen the advantages of regulatory bodies
governing utilities; we have recognized the invaluable ad-
vantage of our Federal Reserve System, These are man-made
devices of control which are operating within our system of
free economy. We could not do without them. It is gradually
becoming obvious then, that there are other man-made forms of
control of great value which can be adopted—which will not
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stifle our economy* The United States is traditionally an
idealistic nation, but like anything ideals cannot stand still.
Our ideals are today emerging from a transitional period. We
are reaching the point where we recognize the need of control
and we are searching our own experience and the lessons of
others so that we may apply these controls wisely.
World War I interrupted for the first time our free
methods of business. Between 191^ and 191S price control,
price fixing, and other commodity controls, which had spread
over all continents, was adopted in the United States in
relatively mild form. Our Ideals of free economy were little
effected by these controls because they were very mild and
considered as temporary expedients until such time as our free
system would be reestablished. After the war, with little
delay, all regulations were withdrawn—unfortunately, almost
Immediately after the armistice.
Price Fixing During World War I
In World War I we had no central price fixing agency
similar to our 0. P. A. The war effort was not an all out one
and we could produce the necessary munitions with little cur-
tailment of domestic production. There was no real need for
central control. Instead the power to fix prices was divided
among a number of agencies which included the Food Administra-
tion, the Fuel Administration, the War Industries Board, the
Price Fixing Committee, the War Trade Board and the War and
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Navy departments. Although there was no central agency there
was a central program, the goal of which was to hold prices
down, and a fair degree of coordination in this policy was
attained through the use of interlocking representatives on
the different committees. The method used has often been
referred to as ’’selective price fixing.”
Numerous methods both direct and Indirect were used
to control prices, but of these two stood out prominently to
characterize our controls, the fixing of maximum prices and
the fixing of maximum margins of profit. Prices were
theoretically free to fluctuate but the tremendous pressure
pushing prices upward brought about a situation where the
maximum price for all practical purposes was also the minimum
price. Margins of profit were fixed to limit excess profiteer
ing. This was usually done on a cost plus basis and carried
through the various levels to the ultimate consumer. To
carry out these techniques patriotic appeals were made to
business men and there was always the threat that the govern
ment might take over industry or requisition any material
needed. The element of fear that the government might
make good its threat exerted enormous influence and secured
the necessary cooperation which assured a relatively success-
ful compliance.
The most important legislation of price control
during the war was the Lever Act for food and fuel. The
purpose as stated in the act was:
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11 to assure an adequate supply and equitable distribution, and
to facilitate the movement of foods, feeds, fuel, including
fuel oil and natural gas, and fertilizer and fertilizer in-
gredients, tools, utensils, implements, machinery, and
equipment required for the actual production of foods, feeds,
and fuel hereafter called necessaries; to prevent locally or
generally, scarcity, monopolization, hording, injurious
speculation, manipulations, and private controls affecting
such supply, distribution, and movement; and to establish
and maintain government control of such necessaries during
the war.” 1
The act contained a provision guaranteeing a minimum price of
$2,00 per bushel for wheat of the 1917 crop, the only instance
of direct fixing by law during the war. All other measures of
control under the Act were to be exercised by the right of
the president to require any industry which he thought
necessary to the war effort to come under a license system.
The Act alao contained authorization for the powerful Federal
Fuel Administration.
United States Food Administration: Shortly after the passage
of the Act the United States Food Administration was set up
with Herbert Hoover as its head. The Administration was res-
ponsible for practically all foods including canned foods.
As basis for the enforcement of its work it utilized the
license system and engaged in a program of publicity to
secure voluntary cooperation. Under the license system,
conditions of operations for food dealers were set up; books
had to be opened for inspection when requested; reports at
1. Lever Food and Fuel Control Act, Approved August 10, 1917.
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frequent intervals were required; transactions with violators
of the law were prohibited; and profits were restricted to a
"reasonable" limit. An elaborate administrative organization
was organized including an Enforcement Division which was very
active. This division granted hearings, suspended licenses,
issued stop orders, and handled all matters relevant to the
enforcement of the Act. From August 10, 1917 to December 30,
1918, the division revoked 676 licenses in addition to other
cases handled in conjunction with state administrators.^ An
unexpected asset in securing compliance was contained in the
gigantic propaganda campaign which utilized all means of
social pressure through the schools, women's clubs, churches,
and other organizations. This campaign was first concerned
with the problem of conservation, but it also served to
familiarize everybody with the rules and regulations of the
Food Administration and it proved a great help in the detection
of non compliers.
The above discussion includes only the broader
aspects of the operation of the Food Administration. There
were of course numerous other techniques supplemented with
special rulings which were necessary to coordination of the
complete price control program. For example in order to
simplify control over bread prices it became necessary to
1. Garrett, Paul W., GOVERNMENT CONTROL OF HUCES, War
Industries Board Price Bulletin #3, Government Printing
Office 1920, p. 145.
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to standardize the size of a loaf of bread. A special board
had to be established to purchase Cuban sugar and sell it to
American refiners so as to equalize the cost differentials
between the two countries. A system of rationing and zoning
had to be worked out to secure adequate distribution of sugar
according to population and needs. The scope of the program
was so inclusive in the food field that every available
technique was needed.
United States Fuel Administration: Under the power given him
under the Lever Act the President created the U.S. Fuel Adminis
tration which assumed complete control over fuel and allied
industries. Its operations were more restricted than those of
other agencies because the others dealt with so many more
commodities. The Administration was similar to that of the
Food administration with officials located in the important
cities throughout the country. The techniques and weapons of
enforcement were also similar to those of the Food Administra-
tion. Authority under the Fuel Administration was entrusted
to Harry A. Garfield, President of Williams College.
The most important problems confronting the Adminis-
tration were how to secure adequate transportation facilities,
how to stimulate production to meet the demand, and how to
control prices in order to prevent a runaway market and excess
profiteering. By the establishment of a zoning system within
which producers had to confine their sales a great deal of
unnecessary cross hauling was eliminated releasing large
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amounts of car space needed for delivery. The fixing of
prices was undertaken at every stage from mining to distribu-
tion, Prices were fixed at first on rough estimates of cost
and later under the bulk line method, 1 Margins were set for
miners, jobbers, and retailers and the attempt was made to
fix them low enough to prevent excess profits, yet not so
low as to remove the incentive to increase production. On the
demand side conservation measures which included lightless
nights and heatless days and reductions in non-war industries
were made. In this manner complete control over a vital
industry was instituted and from the record of its operations
it appears that the control was highly satisfactory.
War Industries Board and Price Fixing Committee: One of the
most powerful agencies of the World War period was the War
Industries Board which grew out of the Council for National
Defence. It was first organized as a part of the Council in
July 1917, but was made an independent agency in May 1918,
with Mr. Bernard Baruch as its chairman. Its jurisdiction
included mainly basic raw materials, but practically all
commodities with the exception of food and fuels came within
its scope. The major task of the Board was to determine
government requirements for munitions and to allocate orders
among the industries that could supply them. In line with
1, See discussion below. Page 52.
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this, priorities had to be determined for these orders and
it became necessary for the board to decide the relative im-
portance of commodities and services to the war effort. Numer-
ous decisions of this type were made. The Board also entered
into many agreements fixing maximum prices. These were usually
arrived at by voluntary offer of the producers or by com-
promise between producers offer and government demands reached
in conference.
1
This method was later implemented by the cost
plus based on scientific principles.
On March 4, 1918 President Wilson created the Price
Fixing Committee to take over the price problems of basic
materials formerly handled by the War Industries Board. The
new committee had independent status, but it worked in close
cooperation with the Board. Besides the chairman of the War
Industries Board the committee was composed of one representa-
tive each from the departments of Agriculture, War, Navy, the
Tariff Commission and the Federal Trade Commission.^ Shortly
after the establishment of the new committee the jurisdiction
of each was sharply defined. Certain industries such as iron,
steel, cement, and lumber which were formerly under the control
of the War Industries Board were transfered to the Price
Fixing Committee. In addition the Committee initiated con-
1. Stein Herbert, GOVERNMENT PRICE POLICY IN U.S. DURING WORLD
WAR, Williams College, Williamstown, Mass., 1939, p. 97.
2. The representative ffcom the Tariff Commission was the noted
economist Dr. F. W. Taussig whose article in the Quarterly
Journal of Economics 1919 is one of the best on the subject.
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trols of hides, textiles, brick, sand, and gravel and other
complementary products. The War Industries Board exercised
controls, independent of the Price Fixing Committee, of
lead, wood chemicals, nitrates, quicksilver, nickel, manganese,
etc. The general procedure of control wag to secure informa-
tion on costs and then to call in the industries in question,
get their viewpoints and then determine a mutually satisfactory
price. After the price wag agreed upon it was recommended to
the President with whose approval it was put into effect.
Little difficulty was encountered in obtaining the cooperation
of industry, for in the event that an industry refused to
cooperate the leaders were informed that the alternative would
be comandeering of output by the government. This threat was
the major means which the Board and the Committee had to
secure compliance.
Price controls during the war were exercised also by
the War Trade Board which supervised exports and imports, the
War and Navy Departments, the Federal Trade Commission, The
Department of Agriculture, the Railway Administration and
other government agencies. However, the most significant
work was done by the four agencies mentioned.
During the early period of control prices were
usually determined by the methods described above. They were
commonly known as the higgling process inasmuch as there
was no really scientific basis for their determination. How-
ever, after price control had become more firmly established.
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it was deaired to replace this method with something more
accurate. It was here that difficulties arose, for it became
necessary to have some standard by which to Judge prices as
reasonable or unreasonable. The chief difficulty which faced
the government was a conflict in its own purposes; on the one
hand to reduce prices, and on the other to maintain maximum
production. The almost universal answer was that prices should
be based on costs plus a reasonable profit but there was wide
disagreement as to which costs should be taken. In almost
every industry there was a wide spread between the average
costs of the most efficient producer and the costs of the least
efficient. With only one producer the problem would be
relatively simple, but with many producers complexities arose.
A high price would afford high profits to the low cost pro-
ducer and a low price would bring complaints from the high
cost producer. On one point there was complete unanimity.
The price fixing agencies were agreed that a single price
was desirable within an industry. They felt that an attempt
to discover the actual cost for each producer would be a
slow and costly process and that fixing prices on a cost plus
profit basis for each producer would eliminate much of the
Incentive to efficiency at a time when the nation was striv-
ing to conserve its resources to the utmost. ^ A sort of
compromise method was adopted. It included in all cases where
1. Stein, Op. Cit., pp. 98-99
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coats were determinable a single price based on cost plus
reasonable margin of profit, and was commonly known as the
"bulk line method*’ of fixing prices,2 The term bulk line
refers to the unit cost of the marginal producer whose output
was considered essential. In order to stimulate production
the price was fixed high enough to ensure profitable opera-
tions for the bulk line producer. According to Taussig "the
marginal or price determining producer was found at a
_ „ 2point where from 80-90 percent of the output was included .
Bulk lines were usually fixed somewhere between these points.
This did not prove a hardship to many producers and though the
low cost producers were enabled to reap large profits it was
felt that these would be drained off in the form of taxes on
excess profits.
Inasmuch as the attempts at price fixing during
World War I were concentrated into a very short period of time,
it is difficult to evaluate them. Studies made, however, indi-
cate that though the index for uncontrolled commodities rose
steadily throughout the war period, the controlled group
declined sharply starting in 1917 when control became effective
and then remained comparatively stable until the end of the
war. In certain industries such as building materials there
was constant increase throughout the period but the controlled
1, In a few cases where cost data was not adequate the price
was determined by averaging market prices over a set
period in the past.
..
I-'-ni • 9 5 Jo ti oo 3 my crfd od ' *i
, I! i
.
. u . 5r i r / •; •: r : 'xua
.
i c.. df adl'.oT r ( [•! Id ' raw cioouf>0‘ d : .vo."
. C/
.
.
rou « t /. r
•
-re 'j -re v \;
r
<de
'
add i-t ' r o :3 Ildnu aidad e i U vtiai ~qrj©o t nlstna* rati3 bat
•
••
dd dud Jjolrcoq add duoffexj<rtdd ru
ia k ic vo oi*i d 3f*x >*n ; r i v “v; &- drf> r? w
.
• * * r ’
prices leveled off and achieved a degree of stability within
a short time after control became operative. It seems fairly
certain then that war time control of prices was successful
in accomplishing its major objective of preventing runaway
prices. The result and significance of war-time price fixing
is summarized by Professor Taussig as follows:
H So far as the experiment went, and so long as it
lasted, the outcome seems to me to have been good....Food
and Fuel prices were prevented from fluctuating as widely and
soaring as high as they would have done in the absence of
regulation. A result of the same kind and apparently not in
less extent was secured for other price regulated articles." 1
Many who have studied out attempts of control agree with
Professor Taussig that it had many favorable effects. Price
rises were checked and profiteering was reduced without having
any appreciable effect on production. It is not to be
assumed, however, that a most economic utilization of
resources took place. As a nation we were still green at this
type of control and the period under consideration was not of
sufficient duration for us to gain adequate experience.
Price Fixing Under the N. R. A.
With much difficulty and in a very haphazard manner
the country went about the business of readjusting itself after
World War I. Indeed the ideal of free economy was so dominant
that it would be more accurate to say that readjustment, if
1* Taussig, Op. Cit., p. 240
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one can call it that, came about by itself. All control was
removed almost immediately after the war and there was very
little, if any, government aid in effecting a smooth readjust-
ment. Under this policy the country progressed through the
boom period which culminated in the stock market crash of
October, 1929* It was at first thought that the depression
which followed would be short lived, but as time went on and
the effects became more severe, it became apparent that
government aid would be necessary. That a gradual change was
occuring in the philosophy of American government was indicated
in the election of 1932. The democratic party under the
leadership of Franklin Roosevelt was swept into office. It was
elected under the promise that it would immediately invoke
measures to relieve the suffering and hardship brought on
by the depression. It was elected because it recognized that
there had been a change in the American ideal of business
without government control and it had incorporated this change
in its platform. Immediately upon taking office President
Roosevelt set about the task of carrying out these measures.
The group of measures carried out by the democratic
administration in the preceding years wag collectively known
as the "New Deal". The National Industrial Recovery Act was
one of the most important of these measures. jThe purpose of
the Act was to promote the recovery of business activity by
spreading employment and increasing industrial payrolls. This
was to be attained by shortening hours of labor and increasing
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rates of pay. The Act algo Intended to secure reforms In
business practices in order that competition might be preserved
from self destruction and that business activity might be
made less liable to disturbance. Under provision of this Act
the National Recovery Administration better known as the
N. R. A. was organized to carry out these measures. The under-
lying theory was that by increasing the purchasing power of
labor through spreading of work and increasing rates of pay,
a stimulus would be given to the stalled wheels of industry.
This stimulus was necessary to overcome the inertia of the
business cycle and set it once more on its way to recovery.
The N.R.A. was therefore concerned with labor conditions and
business practices. Actually the scope of its activities was
so comprehensive and the devices advocated so many that it is
impossible in this discussion to do Justice to every phase.
Our purpose will be achieved if we merely touch on the high-
lights of the control.
There is nothing in the NIBA which specifically
authorizes price fixing either government or private. However,
examination of the debate on the Act of Congress reveals that
some degree of price fixing was intended. This is indicated
in the failure to accept the Borah Amendment specifically
prohibiting price fixing. Instead the amendment was changed
to prohibit codes fostering monopolies or monopolistic
practices. It is evident that though no direct provision
was made both business leaders and legislators were aware of
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the possibilities under the act* Actually what occurred was
price fixing bv business groups rather than by the government
itself. It might more accurately be referred to as private
price fixing with government sanction. It should also be
pointed out that it was not the purpose of the N.R.A. to
directly control price fixing, but that the pressure of events
made its use unavoidable. This situation is explained by
Donald Richberg:
M It was, of course, no part of the original purpose
of the N.R.A. to have anything to do with price-fixing, except
to prohibit any monopolistic price fixing agreements. Yet step
by step through the diabolical logic of events the N.R.A. be-
came the apparent exponent and protector of "price-fixing" —
the hateful objective of that most hated ogre, a big business
monopoly. Like the story of a young man's downfall., "One
thing simply led to another." 1
With the pressure of events price fixing became un-
avoidable. If business intended to increase wages and shorten
hours some concession had to be made to ensure that those who
raised their prices to cover the increased costs would not be
undersold by competitors. A floor on prices had to be set and
indeed in the code making, business saw to it that this con-
cession was secured. This was not the only concession which
business tried to get. The making of codes was characterized
by a sort of horse trading in which business tried to get as
much as possible in return for its concession to lower hours
and increase wages.
1. Richberg, Donald, THE RAINBOW, Doubleday, Doran & Co., Inc.
1936, p. 31.
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Code making was carried out under supervision of the
N.R.A. Most proposed codes were drawn up by trade associations
or similar organizations and hearings were held to determine
whether the proposals were sufficiently representative of the
opinion of the industry, whether labor and consumer provisions
were properly inserted, and whether the provisions with
respect to fair trade practices were properly non-dis crimina-
tory* Industrial, labor and consumer boards were formed to
give assistance, but the dominant members of an industry were
naturally in a preferred position and were able to protect
their particular interests in the codes finally approved. The
process of code making was necessarily a cumbersome one and
there were numerous delays. That the effect of the Act might
not be lost the President invited industry to voluntarily sign
the President's Reemployment Agreement, more popularly known
as the blanket code. The signers of this agreement were
bound to put into effect certain measures regarding maximum
hours, maximum wages, child labor, etc, until codes for their
industry could be formulated. The taking of signatures was
handled by the Post Office Department and there was general
voluntary cooperation stimulated by patriotic motive and the
desire to show the sign of the Blue Eagle, the symbol of the
gentlemen's agreement with the President. 1
1. The Blue Eagle was later superseded by the Code Eagle, a
symbol of compliance with the law.
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Enforcement was handled by the National Compliance
Board in Washington, Branch boards were formed in every com-
munity, and it was their duty to sift alleged code violations,
mediate disputes and interpret the codes. Ten regional direc-
tors were appointed who were to act as intermediaries between
local, state and national boards. In most cases the United
States district courts were open to original action in cases
of alleged violation. In the case of labor violations, how-
ever, the National Labor Board later replaced with the National
Labor Relations Board, was usually the first court of review.
Price fixing devices adopted under the N.R.A. may be
divided into two classes, those which tended to fix minimum
prices and those indirect controls which attempted to limit
available supply. Among the devices which attempted to estab-
lish minimum prices were prohibition of sales below cost, loss
limitation provisions, emergency price fixing, and provisions
directly fixing prices either according to a specific formula
or at an arbitrary level determined by the Code Authority.
Indirect controls on supply included restrictions on new
capital capacity, production quotas, and limitation of hours
for labor and machinery. Other devices which fall outside the
limit of these classifications were used. These include
regulations of credit, discount, premiums, advertising and
trade-in allowances, and were used not so much for the effect
they would have on the level of prices, but rather so that
those who found price fixing not to their liking might not
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engage in practices which would circumvent fixed minimum
prices
.
Open price systems were widely adopted under the
N.R.A. An open price system has been defined as a means by
which "some or all of the individual members of an industry
make available to one another information concerning prices
at which their products have been sold, are being offered,
or are to be offered."'1' The major purpose of these systems
was to make price data available and they were used to
supplement other methods rather than as a direct method in
itself. However they did enjoy wide use and were included in
2
more than 400 codes.
Theoretically minimum prices could be fixed under
most codes but the number of such provisions which actually
became effective was very small. Legally there were only 93
codes in which a minimum price was in effect. The rest of the
codes required sanction for supplementary rules which were
never submitted by Code Authorities,^ Whatever minimum price
fixing was achieved was done through grants of power to Code
Authority (arbitrary), emergency price fixing, or prohibition
of sales below cost. O-rants of power to arbitrarily fix
prices were used infrequently, but the large number of
complaints which arose in connection with this device publicised
1. Abramson and Lyon, THE ECONOMICS OF OPEN IRICE SYSTEMS,
Brookings Institute, p. 3*
2. Ibid., p. 23.
3* "The National Recovery Administration," House Document
#158, 75th Congress, 1st session, 1937, pg. 132.
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it all out of proportion to its importance, 1 This publicity
reached a high peak in April 1934 when a New Jersey tailor
was jailed for pressing a suit for five cents below the code
price. This event led to much adverse criticism and no doubt
influenced the President to sign an executive order suspend-
ing price fixing in codes of local service industries a very
short time later. The Code Authorities found that they had
an almost impossible task on their hands. There were some
hundreds of thousands of separate and distinct prices which
had to be fixed many of which had to be carefully considered
because they were subject to special discounts or differentials.
Though the attempt was to fix minimum prices in most cases
these minimum prices were much too high. It turned out im-
possible to figure prices which would preserve a harmonious
arrangement in all stages of production to the ultimate con-
sumer. Under these circumstances complaints came from both
producers and consumers and they served to make non-
compliers more numerous.
Emergency price fixing became important in February,
1934, when the N.R.A. prepared a new clause covering special
emergency situations. At first a state of emergency was
declared by the Code Authorities with the approval of the
Administrator, but under later policy the Administrator deter-
1. The grants were made in the cleaning and dyeing and
lumber and timber codes.
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mined the existence of the emergency. Emergency price clauses
were included in a great number of codes, but minimum prices
under these provisions were carried out in very few. Many
industries applied for price fixing under emergency clauses,
but the requests were not granted by the administrator, be-
cause it was found that there was divergent opinion as to wba
constituted an emergency. The administrator considered it an
expedient for meeting a temporary situation, such as a price
war, but industry attempted to invoke these provisions to
combat a permanent situation. On the whole little was ac-
complished by the use of emergency price fixing provisions to
establish minimum prices, but the N.R.A. did prevent wide-
spread misuse of the provision.
Prohibitions against sales below cost is another
device found in most codes. Under such provisions it became
unfair to sell below cost except under certain conditions.
^
The argument in favor of such provisions was that they would
prevent price cutting with the resulting bad effect on busi-
ness, particularly small business, for price cutting was
viewed as essentially a monopolistic practice. The term it-
self "sales below cost" implies that it had to be determined
whose cost would be used and even more important what
constituted cost. The terminology used in the various codes
1. The most usual conditions were to meet competition of
lower cost producers and to dispose of distress goods.
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is anything but uniform. The manufacturing codes prohibited
sales below cost of the individual producer. Other codes
referred to ” lowest representative cost'* or "lowest reasonable
cost", all vague concepts with ambiguous meaning. On the
determination of what constituted cost there was even less
uniformity. -*- Under some codes a trade body was allowed to
average the overhead costs in the industry and this average
was used by each member instead of his own costs. Cost of
raw materials were figured at current market value regardless
of prices at which they were actually bought. No real concept
of what constituted price was ever developed under the codes.
Instead there were numerous rules of pricing differing in each
code and often contradicting each other. Even where cost
systems for certain industries were worked out they bad little
effect on prices because no serious effort was made to invoke
and enforce the provisions.
Controls on the supply side were carried out in
about much the same manner. There were provisions in some
codes limiting the use of plant and machinery. The idea
behind this was similar to that of reducing hours for labor.
Unemployment would be alleviated by limiting working hours
and spreading available work. In the matter of practical
application, however, it became difficult to spread fairly.
1. See Terborgh George, Price Control Devices in N.R.A. Codes,
Brookings Institute, for discussion of this point. Ch. 3.
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available work without sacrificing the more efficient producing
plants for the less efficient with the result that the con-
sumer paid a higher price than he should have. However,
aside from this, the limitations that were carried actually
did succeed in limiting the number of units produced. Thi3 was
done by plant limitation and also by use of production quotas
the latter applying to a whole industry rather than to parti-
cular plants.
After but a short period of operation, it was
evident that the codes had been set up too hurriedly and on
too wide a scale to avoid unwise or unworkable provisions. In
March 1934- the National Recovery Board was established, the
purpose of which was to examine the whole N.R.A. set up. In
the following months the Board submitted reports known as the
Darrow Reports which indicated that the codes of a number of
leading industries were controlled by representatives of the
larger firms, favoring conditions of monopoly and seriously
injuring small business. These reports were strongly criti-
cized by NRA officials, but partly in response to the at-
tention focused on these reports and to the growing recognition
of unenforceable provisions alteration in NRA policy were im-
mediately announced.
From the earliest days of the N.R.A. there was
grave doubt as to the constitutionality of the legislation
upon which it was established. The inherent unconstitution-
ality was denounced by laymen as well as trained lawyers.
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The drift of the government in the later period towards a
narrow application of the codes seems to indicate that authori-
ties appreciated the probable unconstitutionality of the
system. The chief hope of the government was that by the
declaration of an emergency the legislation might be con-
sidered constitutional. However the government was obviously
reluctant to submit the legislation to the final test when the
test finally came their reluctancy was justified. Under the
Shechter Poultry Case the Supreme Court decided that the
legislation was an unconstitutional delegation of powers by
the president and that the federal government did not have
the right to regulate hours and wages in intrastate commerce
merely because of the effect on interstate commerce. It is
significant that the Court has reversed itself on every one
of these points since then.
It is difficult to accurately appraise the success
or failure of price fixing under the N.R.A. Adequate informa-
tion concerning the operation of the codes is not available
and the period of operation was really not long aiough.
There were, however, some cases of apparent success. Emergency
declarations in the cast iron soil pipe and agricultural in-
secticide and fungicide industries worked out very well, but
were given little consideration. From the beginning, however,
there was serious doubt entertained about the constitutionality
1 . Backman, Op. Cit., p. 69.
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and this operated as a deterrent to effective compliance. Ag
the program continued there was a gradual break down of price
control and a narrowing of the scope of the program. The
decision in the Schechter case brought the program quickly to
a close.
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CHAPTER V
DIRECT PRICE FIXING
In the course of exchange of goods to satisfy human
needs it can be truly said that in the long run gpods and ser-
vices exchange for goods and services. One good can be ex-
pressed in terms of another good and the ratio between the two
will be determined by the conditions of supply and demand for
the two goods. Actually the expression of goods in terms of
other goods is a complex and unnecessary procedure. Human
ingenuity has introduced money as a medium of exchange and
these ratios are expressed in terms of a common unit. Price
is the expression of this ratio in terms of the common unit
of exchange, but as such it is still determined by the condi-
tions of supply and demand for the particular goods exchanged.
Prices then are really symptoms reflecting the conditions of
supply and demand of goods bought and sold. When prices get
out of hand, it must be taken as an indication that something
has gone wrong with supply or demand or both. If the govern-
ment attempts to alleviate a price situation, it must be con-
cerned with three things, the common unit of exchange, the
supply and the demand for goods. The common unit of exchange
is usually stabilized over a period of time so that actually
the government is concerned with conditions of supply and
demand •
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Direct price fixing refers to attempts to arbitrarily
limit the movement of prices. We have seen that previous at-
tempts to limit the movement of prices have been made without
controlling supply or demand or with control of one and not
the other. The fixing of prices at a level other than would
prevail in a competitive market may drastically affect either
supply or demand or both. Under competitive conditions changes
in supply or demand change the price. Under arbitrary price
fixing the order is reversed; changes in supply and demand are
the result of the fixed price not the cause of it. Examina-
tion of basic economic principle will reveal this fact.
}
In figure 1 we have a graph of competitive conditions of
supply and demand. The supply and demand curves cross at P
which represents the price. Now if the government arbitrar-
ily says that the price will be P* then the demand and supply
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curves will readjust themselves somewhere along the line of
P* The same applies if the government saya that the price
shall be P" . Whether the price be higher or lower than would
otherwise prevail, supply and demand must be affected by an
arbitrary change of price. A situation where a government
for no good reason merely sets a price is very unusual.
Usually there has been a change in either supply or demand,
and the government sets either a maximum or minimum price.
Where a maximum price is set there are forces pushing the
price upward, and where a minimum price is set there are
forces pushing the price downward. Under these conditions
either supply or demand has already been affected and the
symptom reflected in the price.
Government price fixing attempts to either secure a
profitable price for the producer, or to attain an equitable
distribution of goods for the consumer. In either event
government price fixing in itself will be of no avail unless
it is accompanied by supplementary measures. In view of past
experience this fact is to be doubly stressed. Graphic ex-
planation will bring it home even more strongly.
1. Probably to the left of P because less goods will be
demanded at the higher price and more goods will be
offered. Conversly P" will fall to the right of P.
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In figure 2 we have the situation of increasing supply
necessitating the setting of minimum prices. The supply has
here increased so that the price P doe3 not bring to the
producer sufficient return to cover his costs of production.
Merely setting the price at P* will not help the situation
unless steps are taken to reduce the supply so that it will
adjust itself somewhere about P* This is usually done by
means of production or export quotas as in the case of
valorizations or by means of subsidies or other grants to the
producer in return for lowering his production. The entire
market must be taken into consideration for if any producer
is left out, he will increase his production to take advantage
1. In figure 2 we assume P* to be the marginal cost of pro-
duction although in many cases P* has been set far above
the marginal cost of production.
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of a market price which i3 higher than would be under purely
competitive conditions, and he will do so at the expense of
those who are engaged in the restriction programs*
In figure 3 we have the condition of decreasing
supply requiring establishment of maximum prices. Such a
situation may be, as at present, the result of war where the
resources of a nation are mobilized to produce goods not in-
tended for civilian consumption. Civilian goods become scarce
and the available supply goes to those who can afford to pay
the highest price. The government can help by setting the .
price at P* but there will be unequal distribution of the
scarce goods unless a program of rationing is instituted.
Also setting the price at P* arbitrarily will not help matters
unless costs are held down so the producer can afford to sell
his product at P* . This involves an integrated program of
ceiling prices and rationing with everything which goes into
th& manufacture of the finished product held down. Such a
program mu3t also be accompanied by a highly regressive tax
system and some system to force savings. Rationing and price
fixing will help keep price and costs down and distribute
goods fairly, but they will be defeated unless supplementary
measures are not imposed to remove the excess purchasing
power. If one device is tried without the other, or if in
establishing ceilings, one of the factors of production is
left to fluctuate without restriction, there will be a gradual
increase of P* which may end in uncontrolled inflation. It is
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obvious then that arbitrary price fixing in itself is of little
value. It must be accompanied by supplementary measures. In
examining past price fixing experiments it Is amazing to note
how often these facts have been diregard ed.
Four methods of direct price fixing have been noted
in Chapter I. They are:
1. A maximum price
2. A minimum price
3. A fixed range of prices
4. A fixed price relationship.
1. Maximum prices. Maximum prices refer to the
setting of prices above which no transaction may take place.
A ceiling is placed beyond which prices cannot move, but there
is nothing to prevent prices from moving lower in accordance
with conditions of supply and demand. This type of price
fixing is uaually the antidote for an emergency of buyers and
is intended to bring relief to the consumer.
In fixing prices there are three possibilities within
which prices may be set. They may be set higher than the level
which would preval under free competitive conditions; they may
be set lower than this level or exactly equal to it. The latter
situation i3 purely hypothetical for it is hard to imagine a
condition where it would be necessary to set prices at levels
exactly equal to the prevailing level, unless immediate change
was anticipated in which case the situation would be analagous
to either of the other two. If maximum prices are set at
a .
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levels higher than would prevail In the competitive market,
little maladjustment will develop since in all likelihood
prices will be maintained at the lower level. Anybody in-
sisting at selling at the maximum price will simply lose
business to his competitors who would sell at the lower
prices. The important case then is the one where maximum
prices are fixed at levels lower than tend to prevail in the
competitive market.
In this situation there are usually forces at work
pushing prices upward. The fact that prices are being fixed
is in itself indicative that they would be higher if free con-
ditions were left to prevail. It is important to note that
thorough understanding of all conditions prevailing must be
had before fixing is attempted. Practical experiences teach
that there is a definite interdependence of prices which must
be observed if the purpose of price fixing is to be achieved.
This wag brought home in the First World War by a sequence of
events which took place in Germany. Maximum prices were
placed on fats, but not all fats were taken into consideration,
and the ceilings were placed on different fats at different
levels. In the shuffle the price fixing agency had forgotten
to fix the price for lubricating grease and the price of
grease rose several times higher than that of butter with the
result that the farmer found it much cheaper to use butter for
lubricating his machinery than ordinary lubricating oils. 1
1. Hirsch, Op. Cit. p. 78.
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All related condi tions must be taken into consideration, and
it should be borne in mind that maximum prices fixed for one
commodity almost inevitably lead to maximum prices for other
commodities ag well. Also maximum price fixing is not always
the most advisable method for correcting maladjustments.
Maladjustments, usually mean that for some reason or other
supply and demand are not in their usual adjustment. By fixing
the price lower than would otherwise prevail the tendency is
to discourage increase in supply and encourage increase in
demand. This usually occurs at a time when exactly the op-
posite trends are desirable.
Another factor of considerable importance is the
development of forms of evasion when the maximum price is
fixed at a low level. This is particularly true under condi-
tions of scarcity. Maximum prices are set at a low level and
in the course of time scarcity becomes very great increasing
to a high level the price which would ordinarily prevail.
The spread between the legal price and the actual price be-
comes very great encouraging black markets and other forms of
evasion.
1
These forms include weight and measure manipula-
tion, incidental fees, tie-in sales, cash transactions, side
deal cash transactions, and other variant forms,
2, Minimum prices. Minimum price fixing refers to
1, Black market prices when they can be determined reflect to
some extent the price which would exist under normal compe-
titive conditions. They are usually slightly higher in-
cluding return for the risk involved in violating price
fixing laws.
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the setting of floors below which transactions may not take
place. It is usually the child of the seller's emergency al-
though it can be used to the benefit of the buyer if it is
prescribed as an inducement to increase production. This is
particularly true in time of war. Examples of minimum price
fixing have already been discussed. They include valoriza-
tions and restrictive schemes organized on a national and
international basis.
As in the case of maximum prices, the minimum price
can be set at or\e of three levels as compared to what would
prevail under free competitive conditions. It could be set
higher, lower or just equal to competitive conditions. Since
the last situation is similar to that of maximum prices it
need not be discussed. If the minimum price were set lower
than that which would prevail under unrestricted competitive
conditions, little effect would be felt for prices would
remain at normal levels and no significance would be at-
tached to the price fixing until prices fell somewhere near
to the established minimum. This leaves then only the situa-
tion where the minimum is established at a level higher than
would ordinarily prevail. Under these circumstances there
would be a decline in demand and an increase of supply, the
higher price discouraging the consumer and encouraging the
producer. The extent of change in either demand or supply
would depend on the degree of elasticity of the product
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involved.
1
When price is fixed at an artificially high level it
can be stated without too much hesitation that the demand will
decline. We assume that people act in a rational manner, an
assumption which, though the exceptions to it are numerous,
generally holds true. If the price is high, then, the law os
substitution will operate and the consumer will prefer to
purchase a substitute which will afford him a comparable
satisfaction. This situation prevailed in the operation of
the Stevenson Rubber Plan. The British fixed the price at
a relatively high level which aroused public sentiment in the
United States, its best customer, to the point where con-
servation measures were adopted and substitute product, re-
claimed rubber, was developed. The effectiveness of these
measures is indicated by the fact that tire replacement per
p
car in 1925 declined to 1.93 the lowest ever recorded. In
order to make minimum prices effective under these conditions,
it becomes necessary to fix the price of substitute products
as well. It is not always possible to immediately determine
what the substitute will be thus the difficulties in this
connection when such a program is carried out on a wide scale
present many knotty problems.
The statement that high prices will stimulate in-
1. See discussion on elasticity below. Page 19*
2. Whittlesey, C.R., GOVERNMENT CONTROL OF CRUDE RUBBER,
Princeton University Press, 1921 pp. 139-40.
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crease in quantity needs little proof. When price is fixed
under normal competitive conditions it t&nds to be lower than
the conditions set down in this case. By fixing the price
higher everybody is guaranteed a profit. Even the his£i cost
producers who would ordinarily be pushed out of the picture
can now operate at a profit and can increase their production
profitably. There will also be a tendency for capital and
labor to migrate from the less profitable industries to the
more profitable, causing additional increase in supply.
The development of forms of evasion is also an
important factor in the fixing of minimum prices. As the
supply increases due to the stimulation given producers and
the decrease in demand, inventories will accumulate which must
be stored and financed. To the extent that the producer is
able financially to carry thi3 burden the program will be
successful. However, when the burden becomes too great to
bear the producer seeks a way out by selling his accumulated
inventories at prices below the legal minimum. These evasions
take the form of tie-in sales, credits for unwarranted damage
or imperfection, and rebates of commissions and transportation
charges. Conditions such as these may lead to a breakdown of
the entire price fixing system.
3. A fixed range of prices. The fixed range of
prices refers to the situation where both the maximum and
minimum price of a commodity are fixed. The movement of prices
is limited within a predetermined range, the limits of which
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‘19 t Ol
'
'
1 • c
.
:* rt
.
.
.•
.
.
.
.
<
'•
. ii Mfolad oooJ*
; J 1 .
no •' 'nt, , n * fr . o In e.
,
i -
'
"•
. -
.
.
r ; ,t ' t> ‘ .
,
.
:lo : six lo aS lull erJ tognjyi fie ni lineJe : ^ • . *' ntdt l * fie^laail el
77
provide a ceiling and floor beyond which prices cannot move.
The device has been utilized in a few cases all of recent date.
In 1923 the fixing of maximum and minimum prices was
authorized in Argentina. In this case, however, the maximum
and minimum applied in different circumstances. The minimum
applied to the purchase price of beef and cattle, intended for
export and the maximum prevailed for domestic consumption.
The intention was to protect the producer against low prices
abroad and at the same time to protect the consumer against
high prices at home. The same system was used for grains
in Germany during the depression. The Socialists feared that
because of the shortage of gold and foreign exchange grain
imports would be reduced and prices would skyrocket. The farm
bloc feared the opposite development, that after the war debt
question had been settled, foreign exchange would be available
and Russian and American grains would overflow their markets
at very low prices. A compromise was effected with both sides
voting for a plan which included the setting of both maximum
and minimum prices. 1 The compromise proved to be very satis-
factory. Other instances are milk in Hungary and rice in
Japan.2 In Hungary a minimum was established to be paid
producers and a maximum for retailers thus affording protection
for both producer and consumer. In Japan the government
offered to buy or sell at fixed prices within a given range
1. Hirsch, Op. Cit. pp. 105-106.
2. Ibid.
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attempting to accomplish similar purposes. These examples are
indicative of some of the circumstances and methods applicable
in the fixed range of prices.
The difficulties ensuing in this type of price fix-
ing are those discussed under minimum and maximum price fixing.
Inasmuch as price at a given time will prevail at a single
level the difficulties involved depend on the level of prices
in relationship to the range established. At one time one set
of difficulties may be involved and within a short period of
time conditions may have changed so that the opposite dif-
ficulties are involved. Changes in maximum or minimum prices
should be considered not only in light of the immediate
conditions but also in light of future possibilities.
4. A fixed price relationship. The fixed price
relationship refers to fixing the price of a commodity accord-
ing to a predetermined ratio to that of another. A base
period or base price is selected and the current price tied to
this usually on a percentage basis. If the base price is a
fixed price then the current price will be fixed. However
more usually the base price is selected over a period of
time which allowed some fluctuation and the current price
usually allows the same fluctuation.
There is a basic fallacy in setting prices on a
fixed relationship. It is assumed that an unchanging relation-
ship exists between two commodities and that they will con-
tinue t,o have the same relationship in the future as in the
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past. While this may be true for a period of time with some
commodities it generally does not hold true. Society does not
stand still. There are new advances being made all the time.
Relationships between commodities are dynamic, constantly chang
ing, thus as the base period recedes into the past, the current
price becomes outmoded and presents many difficulties.
Perhaps the best example of price fixing on a
price relationship basis is contained in the parity concept on
which agricultural prices in this country are fixed today. The
idea of parity prices developed among agriculturalists in the
late twenties. The desired goal was that agricultural pro-
ducts regain and maintain the same purchasing power with farmer
bought products which existed in the base period 1909-1914*
This period was chosen as a normal period whai the relation-
ship existed on an even basis. 1 The device was incorporated
into New Deal legislation to aid the farmer during the dep-
ression, but it was not until August 1941 that the index of
agricultural prices reached the desired level and restored
the ratio of agricultural prices and prices paid by the farmer
to 100 percent. This was brought on as a direct result of
the war which changed the conditions of plenty in which the
parity concept was bom to conditions of scarcity. Under the
new conditions the parity concept was still maintained. It
was embodied into the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942 as a
1. Hirsch, Op. Cit., Appendix B, p. 229.
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formula to prevent undue increase in the prices of agricultur-i
al products.
It is obvious now that the long cherished parity
concept is very much inadequate. It is based on an inter-
relation of prices of agricultural products which though cor-
rectly reflecting price relationships in those years does not
do the same today. Since that time production costs for
grains and other field crops have gone down owing to the
development of new machinery. The cost of foodstuffs not
subject to machinery has gone up. There has been a change in
nutrition habits which has increased the consumption of dairy
products. The same relationships Just do not exist so that
the parity ideal for which agriculture has struggled is now
inadequate to meet present war needs. 1
1. Black, John D., PARITY, PARITY, PARITY, The Harvard
Committee on Research in the Social Sciences, 194-2.
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CHAPTER VI
INDIRECT PRICE FIXING
Indirect methods of price fixing have been adopted
in an Increasing number of commodities since World War I*
They were introduced during the war and used during the in-
flationary period of the twenties. However, it was after the
collapse of the boom that they really came into their own.
After the depression had been in effect a short time the at-
titude that the government could prevent the full impact of
deflation became prevelant. Government machinery to achieve
this purpose was created. The general thought was to regu-
late the forces of supply and demand and thereby to influence
the level of prices, and it was hoped that such interference
would turn the tide and at the same time mitigate the ill
effects of the depression.
Limitation of Supply
Limitation of supply can be attempted through general
methods which attempt to limit supply generally or it can be
attempted by methods which attempt to limit supply in a parti-
cular market. We shall discuss the general methods first.
Limitation of total supply available can be accomp-
lished either by destroying the present supply or by limiting
the new supply coming into the market or by both. Many
examples are recorded where destruction was adopted as a method
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.
of influencing price. The experience of the Brazilian coffee
valorization is well known. As a result of the activities of
) the valorization authorities supplies accumulated which became
-
so burdensome that it was necessary to embark on a program of
destruction in an attempt to return the commodity to a sound
basis. Over sixty million bags of coffee were destroyed under
this plan. 1 In the United States a similar program was pursued
p
under the AAA. Six million pigs were killed in 1933* One
hundred and ten million dollars was paid to cotton growers
for destroying part of the growing crop.^ Other examples are
available to show that destruction can be used. However, ex-
cept in rare instances, destruction is not a powerful tool.
Its value lies only in the short run. The real problem is to
control the supply coming into the market and it is in this
I
that we are more interested.
The most widely used method of limiting supply has
been to control new production, usually through the adoption
of production quotas. Under the quota system the total sup-
ply to become available is determined by control authorities
and then apportioned among producers on the basis of past
production or sales. This apportionment is in the nature of
a production allotment beyond which the producer may not
produce. In this way a good degree of control over new supply
1. See discussion below. Page 22.
2. Backman, GOVERNMENT PRICE FIXING, p. 195.
3. Fairchild, Fumiss, Buck and Wheldon, A DESCRIPTION OF
THE NEW DEAL, Macmillan Co., N. Y., 1935, pp. 80-83.
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coming into the market exists. The extent of exactness of
control depends on the industry involved, with manufacturing
generally being easier to control than agriculture. In manu-
facturing it is, within limits, possible to determine pro-
duction capacities, and to control these by proper disbursement
of resources. In agriculture the problem is more difficult
since the number of producers is large and production depends
on the niggardliness or bountifulness of nature.
There has been in recent years a large number of
attempts to limit supply by means of production control. We
have from our previous discussion examples in the Chadbourne
Sugar Plan, The Brazilian Coffee Valorization, The Internation-
al Tin Committee, The Stevenson Rubber Plan, and the A.A.A.
In most of these cases control has been relatively successful
in reducing supply to the predetermined amount. It is evident
that this method has found widespread acceptance.
The leading argument advanced in favor of produc-
tion control is that by limiting supply it is possible to
raise prices to a profitable level, more profitable certainly
than would exist if the market were burdened by excessively
accumulated inventories. Theoretically this holds true, but
much depends on the method applied. In the coffee experiment,
for example, the government required all coffee to be shipped
to government agents who in turn controlled the price by
limiting exports. After two particularly fruitful years
government inventories became so overburdening that the
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destruction program already mentioned had to be undertaken.
Under the A.A.A. the effects of plowing under crop land were
offset by unexpected increase in yield per acre. Theoretically
by limiting supply price should rise. However the dynamics of
the economic machine do not always bring about this result.
Too many factors are operating. Demand is uncontrolled.
Nature cannot be controlled. There are a thousand and one
factors operating which may more than offset the decrease in
supply even after it has been brought about.
One of the bad effects of a restriction scheme is
that it interferes with the natural process of distribution
of labor and capital. Under purely competitive conditions
price would remain low until capital and labor were driven
from the unprofitable occupations into the more profitable
ones. With restriction price is maintained and there is a
shift in the marginal producer. High cost producers which
ordinarily would be driven out are allowed to stay and costs
tend to be higher than they would be if the production were
distributed among the more efficient procuders. Also of signi-
ficance is that restriction may create idle labor and capital.
In a period of increasing business activity this is net too
important for the surplus labor and capital is readily ab-
sorbed in new production. On the downward swing of the cycle
this becomes very important because it creates surplus labor
and capital which cannot find employment at a time when such
employment is badly needed. Surplus labor is certainly no
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There are many methods other than production quotas
which have been used to limit total supply of a commodity.
These include limitation of machine hours and working hours,
control over planting and acreage, and control over establish-
ment of new capacity. These are not all, but it must be
remembered the problem depends on the particular industry and
conditions involved and that often special techniques are
developed to fit the needs of a particular situation.
Limitation of machine and working hours has been
used as a supplementary method in price control. It involves
two alternatives; either to keep part of the machinery idle
and to maintain the same work week or to reduce the work week
without interfering with the former, or possibly both.^ The
mechanism was used most frequently in the N.R.A. codes where
provisions were adopted providing for limitation of number of
hours or shifts which machines could operate. At best it
affords a loose form of control and if used alone may cause
difficulties far out of proportion to benefits received. The
prime value of this method lies in its effect as a supplement
to other methods of supply limitation.
Control over planting and acreage is the method
used to limit the production of agricultural products. This
1. Reduction of hours is not to be confused with minimum
hours in the minimum wage and hour laws. While the
effects may be similar the purposes are very different.
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method assumes that there is a strong correlation between the
amount of seed planted, the number of acres planted and the
size of the crop, and thus by controlling planting and acreage
the total production may be limited. In the long run there
is probably a very high degree of correlation, but over a
short period of time it is obvious that little reliance can
be placed on this. Such control, then, is very broad and
without any assurance of exactness, the applications depending
on the produce involved. In the case of rubber, for example,
this control can be used only as part of a long range program
since a period of six years is required for a rubber plant
to mature. Very often in this six year span conditions have
changed and different expedients are required. For products
whose period of growth is not so long this control can be
used with much more efficiency inasmuch as it is possible to
change requirements from year to year.
The most outstanding experiment in this type of
control was the A.A.A. In this experiment the curtailment was
at first voluntary, but limitation was effected by subsidy
payments which motivated the farmer to limit his acreage and
planting. When the voluntary method became unsatisfactory,
effectiveness was maintained by making curtailment compulsory. 1
Under this program it was found that there was an important
1# Bankhead Cotton Control Act provided for tax equivalent to
50% of the average market price for cotton ginned in
excess of quotas.
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difference between control of acreage and control of planting.
It was fairly easy to check on decrease in acreage, but rather
difficult to enforce decrease in planting. Production quotas
based on past production were established, but the farmer
could not adhere to these. The size of the crop depended not
% *
only on the amount of seed planted, but also to weather,
irrigation, insects, fertilizer, etc. Thus in 1933 although
the acreage was reduced by twenty-five percent the crop was
slightly larger than that of the preceding year.^ The A.A.A.
proved decisively the impossibility of accurately controlling
the supply by these methods alone.
In the manufacturing industries, when supply be-
comes excessive, it is possible to exert 3orae influence on
the supply coming to market through control of new capacity.
This involves control of new capacity entering an industry
and also control over expansion and modernization of existing
capacity. However, as in agriculture this control must be
accompanied by production quotas for it is possible to work
existing equipment longer hours 'or extra shifts and thereby
make up any deficiency caused by control of equipment. Limita-
tion should be broad enough to allow for the introduction of
improved machinery, otherwise industry will be frozen at a
given level and will not be able to advance through the use
of technological improvements. It should be noted here also
1. Richards, H.I.. COTTON UNDER THE A.A.A., Brookings
Institute, 1934, p. 36 .
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that control over capacity la In itself of little value unless
used as a supplement to other measures in a coordinated program
Limitation of Supply In A Particular Market
Limitation of supply in a particular market is dis-
tinguished from those controls aimed to limit supply in the
total market. Many experiments have been a combination of
both types of control; in fact, a combination of both controls
is desirable. For our purposes we will distinguish the
1 imitation of supply in a particular market from general limi-
tation by referring to the former controls as marketing con-
trols and the latter as production controls. We have already
examined the general production controls. We shall now turn
to the marketing controls. These fall into two broad classifica-
tions, those which operate through regulation of exports and
imports, and those which have to do with surplus manipulation.
Controls over exports may be undertaken to effect
the price in the world market or to effect the level of
domestic prices. Those which attempt to control price in the
world market most always use the export quota device. Under
this device quotas are assigned to the participating countries
for the purpose of controlling the amount of goods shipped
from each country. Outstanding experiments in which this
method of control has been used include: the Stevenson Rubber
Plan, coffee valorizations in Brazil, the Chadbourne Sugar
Plan, and the International Tin Plan. In our previous
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studies of these plans we have seen some of the reasons why
these experiments have not always worked. In the coffee
valorization exports were controlled but no attempt was made
to control production, and the control collapsed of its own
weight. In the Cuban sugar restriction this pitfall was
avoided and the plan met with more success. However, in all
fairness it must be mentioned that the difficulties involved
in control of production of 3ugar are far less than those
which would have had to be met had control of production of
coffee been attempted. In the Stevenson scheme we saw con-
trol attempted without proper consideration of supply from
outside areas. The participating countries benefited from
the higher price, but this was more than offset by the loss
of world markets to the Netherlands East Indies, which was
motivated to increase its production by the artificially high
price. In the Chadboume plan another difficulty was pres-
ented. Here argument between two participants was instigated
by the fact that Javanese producers were able to produce at
lower cost than the Cuban producers and thus objected to the
continuation of the restriction. They realized that because
of their low cost they could supply a good proportion of the
world's needs at a price which would still be profitable.
Under the restriction scheme the price was higher, but the
curtailment of production had brought adverse effects on
their domestic economy. The problem was the dissatisfaction
of the low cost producers, one that is always present in a
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Joint venture of this type. Another problem is ttat of con-
sumer resistence resulting in a shift to a substitute product.
Under export controls or international agreements, particularly
in those agreements in which the participating countries are
not consumers, this difficulty is very important, for if
prices are allowed to rise to unnecessary high levels, it is
almost certain that the consuming countries will search for a
substitute. The case in example here was the Stevenson Plan.
The high price of rubber brought loud protests from the United
States and a gradual change to reclaimed rubber. These are
some of the problems we have already encountered. They are
frequently met in the attempt to control world supply through
regulation of exports.
Control over exports may be used to control price in
the domestic market. This type of regulation is intended to
influence the domestic price by stimulating exports of
surplus products rather than by decreasing the quantity
available for sale in the domestic market by limitation of
production. H In essence most of these schemes take the form
of dumping measures. If the commodity cannot be sold abroad
in the normal course of business, it would either have to
remain at home and depress the domestic price or be dumped in
foreign markets. It Is to be expected that this control
would lead to strained international relationships.
1. Packman, Op. Cit., p. 221
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Often dumping in foreign markets is encouraged by
the payment of a bounty to the producer for that portion of
his output which is being exported at lower prices than
prevail in the home market. By encouraging exports less sup-
ply is available for the domestic market, and the producer
receives a higher price than he would otherwise get. Bounties
are paid in the form of equalization fees or import certi-
ficates. Under the equalization fee device the surplus above
domestic requirements is exported, the difference between the
export price and the domestic price being made up by a dif-
ferential loan assessment on each unit of domestic production.
This device is usually used in agriculture. 1 In the use of
import certificates, certificates are issued to exporters of
specified products who may use them to pay import duties on
the same or other specified products. These certificates are
transferable and are readily sold to importers who buy them
at a small discount, and use them to pay import duties.
One defect in the use of bounties is that it is
difficult to estimate what the domestic demand will be and
this may result in over exportation which causes a higher
domestic price. This in turn causes a decrease in domestic
consumption and an increase in domestic supply necessitating
further surplus exportation. The only one who benefits is
the producer. The consumer is adversely affected by having
1. Black, J.D., AGRICULTURAL REFORM IN THE UNITED STATES,
McGraw-Hill Book Co., New York, 1929, p. 232 .
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to pay a higher price than is necessary and very likely will
become irritated with the knowledge that foreign consumers
can buy the product of his labor at a lower price than he
can* With the growth of strong economic nationalism and its
concomitant high tariff barriers, the utilization of export
bounties has become less practicable since the markets in which
dumping can take place have all but disappeared*
Within recent years control over imports has been
used very frequently* Such control takes the form of import
restrictions which attempt to regulate commodities which a
country does not produce in sufficient quantities or in the
production of which a country is relatively less efficient
than other countries from whom the same goods may be obtained*
The devices used include tariffs, import quotas and import
monopolies. The tariff has been the most widely used*
For a commodity which is on an import basis the
tariff is an important device used to regulate domestic price,
for invariably the domestice price will tend to equal the
import price* If imports are needed to fill the gap in domes-
tic demand then they will be added to the total supply and
cleared at one price which will be in the region of the
import price. If they are dumped at a price lower than the
domestic price, the latter will drop to the import price. If
a tariff is used, domestic price will tend to equal the
import price plus the tariff duty.
It has been found desirable to maintain the price
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of imports at an unchanging level so as to avoid the effects
of changing conditions in the world markets. The mechanism
designed to do this is the sliding scale tariff. Here the
duty is altered on a sliding scale as the price in the world
market varies. Assume for example that domestic producers of
wheat were satisfied to have a price of $1.50 per bushel.
When the domestic price was $1.25 then the duty would be
$.25 per bushel. If it fell to $1.00 then the duty would be
$.50 per bushel. If the price rose above $150 then foreign
wheat could come in duty free. It can be seen that as long
as we import wheat and as long as import prices do not go
above $1.50, the price of wheat will tend to be at that level
The same effect can be accomplished by a high fixed tariff;
indeed both methods have been used. However, the sliding
scale method does have a degree of flexibility which is lack-
ing in the fixed tariff. The one big defect in the sliding
scale device is that it does not allow for technological im-
provement and must be constantly revised to provide for this.
If improvements in production in an exporting country result
in a decline in price, the consumer in the importing country
does not receive the benefit of this improvement in the form
of lower price.
The total quantity imported can be controlled with
a high degree of exactness. The devices used to do this are
the import quota and monopoly. Under the quota system a
quantity quota to be imported is set up for each commodity
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for a specified period of time and imports are restricted to
that quota. It is possible that imports may be less than the
quota, but they may not exceed it. By limiting the quantity
in this manner competition of imports with domestic products
will be minimized and it becomes possible to fix the domestic
price at a higher level than would prevail if there were a
constant danger that imports would depress the price. The
emphasis is on quantity and not price and to that extent it
is easily administered. However, it does have a disadvantage
in that it practically excludes the possibility of world
conditions affecting domestic price. Under the tariff
shortages can be made up by importing even if at a higher
price. Under the quota system when the quota limit has been
reached no more can come in. The price then fluctuates
according to the local supply and these fluctuations can
often be very sharp and the cause of much uncertainty. The
import monopoly reflects the meaning of its title. It is a
centralized buying unit which has the sole right to buy im-
ports. It generally buys domestic goods at a higher price
than import goods, averages this with the import goods and
sells the total supply to the consumer at a price which will
enable it to break even. In effect it is a subsidy paid to
domestic producers by the consumer.
1. All import restrictions may be considered subsidies in
the sense that the consumer pays a higher price than he
ordinarily would.
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We have been looking at export and import controls
as devices used by governments to regulate price in a given
market. Inasmuch as the subject is today a vital one, it is
impossible to leave it without some mention of the theory
behind it. Import and export controls are instruments which
restrict international trade. They prevent countries from
gaining the advantages of geographic distribution of labor.
As it is put by John Stuart Mill,
"if two countries which traded together attempted to
produce for themselves what they now import from one another,
the labor and capital of the countries would not be so produc-
tive, the two together would not obtain from their industry so
great a quantity of commodities as when each employs itself in
producing the things in which its labour is relatively most
efficient." 1
i
This is the classical doctrine of international trade. It is
objected to on the grounds that cheap labor in one country
enables that country to out-compete the country where labor
costs are higher. This may or may not be true, depending on
the conditions. The important thing to note is that it is
not the cost of labor which enables a country to sell its
goods cheaper than other countries. It is the efficiency of
its labor. To the extent that a country insists on producing
goods in the production of which it is less efficient than
other countries, it is a tax on its consumer and makes for a
lower level of living. It is realized of course that such
controls cannot be abolished by the action of one country by
1. Mill, John Sturat, PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, Apple-
ton & Co., New York, 1880, p. 131* Vol. II.
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itself. Reciprocal or joint action is necessary, and the
abolition should be gradual over a period of time. For a
world of civilized nations this goal should not be too diffi-
cult to achieve. 1
Turning from export and import controls we shall now
examine how it is possible to effect the total supply by sur-
plus manipulation. The purchase of surplus stocks to prevent
them from depressing the market has frequently been adopted
as a method of indirect price fixing. Stocks may either be
purchased from producers or withheld from the market under a
loan program. Experiments have been attempted involving
either one or a combination of both methods. We have examined
some of these in our previous discussion, and found that most
of them resulted in failure. There are a number of reasons
for this. First of all many of these plans have been attempted
without the necessary supplement, production control. The
result has been that when the price was raised, demand
declined and supply increased necessitating further accumula-
tion of stocks. Many plans, particularly those of an inter-
national nature, were undertaken without full control of the
available supply. These eventually failed because those pro-
ducers outside of the plan were able to increase their pro-
duction and take advantage of higher price at the expense of
1. The only logical argument for barriers to international
trade is that they are necessary to maintain inefficient
industry in a world of military and economic insecurity.
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those engaged in the control. To avoid this danger the scheme
should, as far as possible, be made compulsory for all produ-
cers who are materially able to effect the total supply. An-
other difficulty often encountered arises when governments
attempt to dispose of accumulated stocks. It will be recalled
that stocks are withheld with the intention of releasing
them in the lean years when they are needed. The difficulty
here is that opportune lean years do not turn up when expected
This necessitates excessive storage charges and large losses.
If the government attempted to minimize its losses by dis-
posing of some of it3 stocks the cry would arise that the
government was competing with its own citizens. If these
stocks were dumped abroad, it would not be long before trade
barriers would be adopted preventing this. Distress stocks
are very difficult to dispose of and usually the cry of dis-
satisfaction comes from those groups who have been helped by
the government’s action in accumulating the stocks.
Government loans to producers is another form of
surplus manipulation. Loans are granted to the producer
making it possible for him to withhold from the market supply
which would depress the price. The idea behind these loans
is that the producer is placed in a position where he can
withhold his supply from the market until such time as he is
able to oftain a better price. The most familiar example in
the United States is that of the Federal Farm Board where,
despite large loans, the Board was not able to control the
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price of wheat and cotton. The difficulties here are similar
to those noted above. It is not always possible to dispose
of the stocks at a higher price, in fact in most experiments
these stocks have been disposed of at a loss. There is also
a strong tendency to set loan values too high so that eventu-
ally the government owns all the accumulated stocks and
incurs most of the loss.
Limitation of Demand
Limitation of demand involves conditions exactly
opposite to those which would exist under limitation of
supply. As we have seen previously, limitation of demand is
necessary in a buyer’s emergency and purports to bring relief
to the consumer. Market conditions are those of scarcity in
which a seller’s market prevails. A seller's market may
prevail for a single commodity as for example, in a monopoly
where one or several firms control the market and limit the
supply so as to get a higher price; or it may exist in general
for all commodities as in time of war when industries which
normally produce goods for civilian consumption are engaged
in the production of munitions of war. Problems of government
control over monopolies, while related to the subject of price
control, involve analysis of conditions peculiar to monopoly
alone, and for this reason we shall exclude them from our
discussion. Our main interest lies in the limitation of
demand under general conditions of scarcity.
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Is limitation of demand through government effort
desirable? The answer to this question depends on the condi-
tions prevailing. In time of war, however, it is not only
desirable, but necessary. When goods which normally flow to
civilian consumers are diverted to other purposes, a scarcity
will prevail which will cause increase in price. The govern-
ment may attempt to fix prices directly, but any such program
can hardly succeed unless it is supplemented by measures which
will decrease the demand to a point where it will approximate
the supply. To the extent that demand is greater than supply
forces will exist which will bid up the price and negate the
effort of the government to fix prices directly. The total
supply available will not be distributed equitably, those with
higher incomes getting more than their share of available
supply at the expense of those with small incomes.
It can be seen that under conditions of scarcity
limitation of demand is one phase of a general program of
price control aibed at avoiding inflation. Inflation may be
defined as a condition where there is more money than goods.
It is possible to describe degrees of inflation according to
relative abundancy of goods and money at a particular time.
It may come about by increase in credit and currency or throug
decrease in goods, or as is usually the case, through condi-
tions in which a combination of these forces is working.
Conditions of scarcity are particularly conducive to inflation
for if left unhampered, the propensity to acquire goods in-
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stead of money will rai3e prices to the point where economic
machinery will not operate. The process of distribution of
goods will cease and chaos will prevail.
To avoid inflation under conditions of scarcity a
coordinated program of price control must be undertaken, in
which the direct methods are supplemented with the indirect.
Price cannot be fixed unless the demand is regulated. This
involves rationing. The demand cannot be regulated unless
the excess purchasing power which makes this demand effective
is drawn off. This involves taxation. To the extent that
taxation does not completely draw off this excess purchasing
power an inflationary gap will exist and will necessitate
the use of some form of savings, either voluntary or forced.
These are briefly phases of the coordinated program of price
control which aim to limit demand as a means of avoiding
inflation. We shall discuss each phase in itself and in
relation to the general program.
Rationing.—Rationing is the method by which scarce
commodities are equitably distributed. The idea is not new.
It has been used in the past in besieged cities to conserve
scarce supplies and to maintain order. It was used on a
national scale by the Germans during World War I, and during
the period of runaway inflation which followed the war. In
World War II it has again come into use on a similar pattern,
"it involves the distribution of fair and equal quantities
to every individual of the same consumer class by means of
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rationing expenditures for specific commodities are rationed;
under specific, quantities of specified commodities are
rationed. General rationing was first proposed by M. Kaleki,
2
and was endorsed by other students of the plan. The exponents
of this plan held that specific rationing would involve the
use of numerous sets of coupons and cause excessive difficultie
of control and administration. They argued that the poor who
do not utilize their ratio ns to the fullest extent would be
able to transfer the remainder to the rich and thus minimize
the effect of rationing. They felt that under general
rationing these undesirable features would be eliminated.
Total maximum expenditures would be fixed for adults and
children and for those doing heavier work who required addi-
tional rations. The maximum expenditure would include the
sum total available for consumption with the exception of
those items which were plentiful and did not have to be
rationed, or those which could be better controlled by other
methods. The opponents of the .plan insisted that it would be
unwise to allow retailers to sell goods without coupons and
quantity ration cards, booklets or certificates,” 1 Today
rationing has many forms, but the basic outlines are similar
in all countries.
Rationing may be general or specific. Under general
s
1. Hirsch, Op. Cit., p. 136.
2. Kaleki, M., GENERAL RATIONING, Institute of Statistics,
Oxford Bulletin, January 11, 1941.
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that if coupons were used the administration would be excess-
ively cumbersome. The most outstanding advantage of the scheme
would be that consumers and retailers would handle only one
set of coupons. Specific rationing of some commodities would
still be necessary and it would still be possible for the
poor to transfer their unused coupons to the rich. The plan
was widely studied, and while endorsed by many, it never
gained popularity among government sources and has thus
never been attempted. A plan of this type would be instru-
mental in bringing about the necessary reduction in civilian
purchases. However, it is bound to bring difficulties in
communities where living standards of various groups of the
population are highly differentiated. 1
Specific rationing may be applied in those instances
where it is possible to ration quantities of specified com-
modities. The most important prerequisites are that the com-
modities have a reasonable degree of uniformity and can be
easily divided. In this country specific rationing has been
applied to gasoline, sugar, coffee, and shoes. In Europe it
has been generally confined to foodstuffs.
A variant of specific rationing is group rationing,
sometimes called point rationing. It involves the grouping of
commodities, such as canned goods, meats and fats in the Unitec
States and clothing in Germany and England, with an allotment
1. Spiegal, Op. Cit., p. 196.
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of points made for a specific period for the group as a whole.
The different commodities within the group are assigned point
values which may be changed from time to time depending on
their relative abundance or scarcity. The plan is advantageous
in that it lessens the number of coupons necessary as the
number of commodities needed to be rationed grows larger, and
in that it allows a freedom of choice which is necessary,
inasmuch as requirements vary from individual to individual
and place to place.
Another variant of specific rationing is that which
is carried out under license or special permit. It is used
for those commodities which are very scarce and require care-
ful distribution. Tires and automobiles have been rationed in
this manner in the United States. The Germans have used it
for shoes and overcoats.
One of the most difficult problems facing rationing
authorities is the fixing of the amount of the commodity to be
distributed. Under specific rationing this involves the set-
ting of coupon values; under group rationing it involves
determination of point values. In a free market, supply is
cleared either by a drop or rise in price, which may take
place within a very short space of time. When a commodity is
rationed and point or coupon value set, it takes time for the
authorities to survey the market and to determine whether or
not the supply has been cleared, and it is difficult for them
to set the ration exactly at the proper value where at a given
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price, the entire supply will be cleared. If the ration is
fixed too small, spoilage may occur. This will bring valid
cries of complaint from the retailer who is forced to take a
loss by virtue of unwise judgement in which he has had no
voice. If losses are very great, there will be strong tempta-
tion on the part of the retailer to unload the excess supply
in violation of the rationing program. On the other hand, if
rations are fixed too large, shortages will occur, not unlike
those which would occur in a system of price control without
rationing. It is very important that rationing authorities
have available detailed market data indicating changes likely
to occur.
There are numerous supplementary measures which
must be instituted to achieve a successful program. Rationing
must be comprehensive, not only including those commodities
which need to be rationed, but also including all stages of
the productive and distributive process. If, for example,
coupons are given by the consumer to the distributor, he
must in turn give them to the producer who is also limited
in his distribution by the number of coupons he receives. The
ration program must apply to these levels, for it is im-
possible to accomplish equitable limitation of demand unless
control is so extended. One of the technical difficulties in
this control is that the handling of coupons becomes excess-
ively cumbersome by the time it reaches the producer. This
has been overcome by the use of the ration bank. Coupons are
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deposited through regular banking sources and special accounts
kept. Instead of handling large amounts of coupons, checks
are drawn, and, like money, balances in coupons are transferred
from one to another. This method has been highly successful
in securing adequate control beyond the distributive stage.
The word 'rationing* implies the idea of equal
quantities fairly distributed. 1 Precise equal rationing, how-
ever, can almost never be accomplished; indeed, it is not to
be desired. An adequate ration program should be flexible
enough to allow for extra rations where they are needed.
Special categories should be created for laborers doing extra
hard work, such as miners, foundry and munition workers. These
men, because of the nature of their work, need special foods
or larger rations. Children and pregnant mothers need extra
amounts of milk. Equality, while implying democratic fairness,
is not always practical, thus it is advisable that there be
sufficient flexibility to provide for special circumstances.
The British have been particularly successful in this respect.
They have made wide use of the "canteen system" under which
large groups are fed by the government at low cost. Special
diets are prepared containing nutritional values for the needs
of different groups. They have distributed fruit juices, cod-
liver oil, and milk to expectant mothers and to school childrea.
>
1. Distribution of equal quantities does not allow for differ-
ences in quality. Rationing may be formally egalitarian,
but it places the poorer at a disadvantage by requiring the
same number of coupons for cheap and expensive articles.
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They achieved not merely limitation of demand, but wise limita-
tion of demand.
Taxation. To the extent that rationing does not
succeed in limiting demand to the point where it approximates
supply, a gap will exist which will be closed in part by
voluntary savings and in part by inflationary increase of
prices* As it is put by Spiegel,
"Forced abstaining occurs when people are made to
pay taxes out of their current income, leaving them only part
of their dollar income for consumption, or when dollar income
available for consumption is left intact, but buys only a
smaller amount of goods
.
Inflation automatically closes the gap that is left by in-
adequate rationing. Taxation, in that it is a means of draw-
ing off excess income which would otherwise be used to bid up
prices of existing supply, is an expediant which will help to
avoid inflation.
It is to be noted that if minimization of inflation
is desired, particularly in wartime, neither the principle of
"ability to pay" or "benefits received" can be allowed to
stand in the way of limitation of demand. These principles
may be workable in certain periods of a relatively slow
changing economy, but must be set aside under the threat of
approaching inflation. In such an emergency taxation should
be primarily designed to reduce the rate of consumption.
In recent years all tax systems have tended to be-
1. Spiegel, Op. Cit., p. 129
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come more progressive, that is, they have levied a higher
percentage of income from the wealthy than from the poor. With
the increased need for government revenue this was found to be
very practical. In proportion to sacrifice, it was found that
the rich could pay a larger percentage of their income at less
sacrifice than the poor. It was also found that the rich
saved more of their incomes in proportion to the poor and
were, therefore, more able to pay taxes than the poor. If the
tax system is progressive, it helps very little to make it
more so, for the additional income to be derived is that
which would ordinarily go into savings. The problem in
limitation of demand is not to reduce the accumulation of
savings, but to reduce accumulation which would be used to
bid up prices on scarce commodities. The emphasis should be
more on regressive taxation, that which will levy income from
those groups which do not save.
Regressive taxation can be achieved by changes in
existing forms of taxation and by addition of new forms. In
the past the tendency has been to rely on the income tax as
a main source of revenue. By broadening the base of this tax
it becomes possible to include the low income groups, without
destroying the progressive nature of the tax in the higher
levels. This was done in the case of the Federal Income Tax
by lowering exemption levels and by increasing surtax rates
on the lower levels. However, it was not accomplished with-
out difficulty. It was necessary to convert the method of
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payment so that the income was collected at the source. It
was also necessary to forgive a portion of one year's taxes
and simplify the forms. In spite of the difficulties at
first encountered, the tax is now workable and ’for the
most part is accomplishing the purposes for which the changes
were made. The sales tax is a form of taxation purely regres-
sive. It falls on the lower income groups and to that extent
is an excellent means of drawing off excess purchasing power.
It came into wide use shortly before the war as a means of
producing additional revenue for local governments. Although
the tax is definitely regressive, it has not been adopted on
a national basis in the United States. It is still used as a
source of revenue by local governments who have strongly
opposed any move by the national government to enter this
field. Another form widely used is the commodity or excise tax.
Both local and national governments use this form of taxation,
but the national government ha3 used it, especially in the
present emergency, as a means of drawing off purchasing power.
Heavy excise taxes will accomplish exactly this even though
they are not levied at the point of distribution. They may be
applied at the production end where they are easier to collect,
and through a process of shifting made to fall on the consumer
who will bear the ultimate burden.
Excess profits taxation is another form. This type
of taxation is little help in avertlg inflation since it ab-
sorbs incomes that would otherwise accrue to persons in the
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higher income brackets. While such taxes are needed to main-
tain the morale of labor and consumers who are heavily taxed,
they reduce the rate of savings rather than the rate of con-
sumption and are therefore of little value in aiding limitation
of demand.
Savings : --Rationing and taxation are means of remov-
ing excess purchasing power, but to the extent that they do
not succeed in totally removing the inflationary gap they
should be supplemented by some form of savings either voluntary
or forced. We in the United States have not seen fit to adopt
a system of forced savings. This system, however, has been
adopted in England and in Germany.
By compulsory savings is meant the transfer of
monies to tax authorities who will return them after the
emergency is over. These payments are not taxes since taxes
are not normally returned to the taxpayer; neither are they
loans since a loan implies a voluntary act not a compulsory
levy. However, these payments do represent a blending of
loans and taxes, a measure which lies half way between the
two. The most important proponent of the deferred payment
plan has been John Maynard Keynes, the British economist. The
plan has come to be known as the "Keynes Plan". He viewed the
plan, as an expedient in the war emergency which would with-
draw from immediate consumption a portion of each man’s earn-
ings to be returned to him after the war was over. 1 While it
1. Keynes, J. M., HOW TO PAY FOR THE WAR, Harcourt, Brace and
Co., New York, 1940.
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was a wartime measure which would accomplish the purpose of
limiting demand, it was not this feature which made the plan
attractive to Mr. Keynes. It was rather that deferred payments
would provide a reservoir of demand for consumer goods to
become effective in the period after the war when cessation of
war production would result in business recession. However,
the "Keynes Plan" has in it a large element of value. It would
withdraw purchasing power from that area needed in the emer-
gency and make purchasing power available in the same area
where it would be needed after the emergency. It would to a
large measure compensate the poorer classes who actually bear
the sacrifice by giving them additional future income. Finally
it would help avoid a possible rise in interest rates which
might occur if finance were handled mainly through regular
fluctuating treasury issues. Although these advantages were
recognized by many, the plan never gained favor in the United
States
.
The American method has been that of voluntary loans.
Unfortunately, these loans have not been taken up by the proper
groups and this method has much to be desired. For the most
part emergency expenditure in the United States has been
financed through banks. The proportion of Series E bonds sold
to the public has been small by comparison to other issues and
this has resulted in a very great extension of bank credit.
Bank credit in itself is Inflationary only to the extent that
such credit exceeds the rate of savings. If credit were ex-
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panded at the same rate of savings the basis of this expansion
would be the savings which if not saved would be used to bid
up prices of scarce goods. When credit is expanded beyond
the rate of savings the additional credit, if not drawn off by
taxation, is available to bid up prices and is a threat to
inflation. We have seen this operate in the United States
where credit has expanded almost to the limits allowed for
the Federal Reserve System. There is at present a movement
afoot to lower the reserve requirements because additional
credit expansion to carry on the war effort is needed, 1 We
see here a desire to stave off inflation on the one hand, yet
the adoption of measures definitely inflationary on the other
hand. The reason for this is that the war expenditure is so
great that even if it were possible to drain off every bit of
excess purchasing power in the form of savings or taxation,
there would be need for additional credit expansion. To this
extent the trend toward inflation cannot be avoided. The sale
of war bonds directly to citizens on a voluntary basis is
likely to result in greater savings were this to be accomplish-
ed by natural means, but it definitely does not go far enough
in the direction of removing to the greatest extent possible
excess spending power. No doubt this would be helped by a
plan of forced savings. But it is to be remembered that in
choosing a plan of this nature there are other considerations
1. Done by Act of June 12, 1945.
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than purely economic ones. It is one thing to recognize what
must be done. It is another to do- it most practically.
method. The British, on the other hand, have adopted a variant
of the Keynes Plan. They have reduced exemptions and personal
allowances on their income tax and increased rates. They have
provided, however, for a return in the postwar period in the
form of credit with the ,P.O. Savings Bank of that portion of
the tax due to lowered exemptions and personal allowances.
Similar return payments were provided for a portion of the
excess profits tax. They also use the voluntary loan method,
but by making taxes heavy on th lower levels they drain off
excess spending power and conserve a portion of it to be used
as a deferred demand in the postwar period.
there still existed a large inflationary gap. A scheme of
advance payments was instituted in attempt to decrease tne
extent of the gap. The people were sold on a program of paying
in the present for a Volkswagen or a national automobile to be
made after the war. Here also the idea was to limit demand by
drawing off purchasing power which would be used to bid up
prices.
supply and demand as objective aspects of price control. It
is obvious that while they may be considered objectively.
As a practical matter we have relied on the volunta
In Germany after most of these methods had been used
In this chapter we have examined limitation of
they must be analyzed in light of the entire economy of which
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they are a part. We shall therefore turn to the war economy
of the United States and see how these measures and others
necessary in a war economy have been carried out.
I I w.
f
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CHAPTER VII
PRICE CONTROL IN THE UNITED STATES -- WORLD WAR II
The main objective of the war effort is to increase
the production of instruments of war. The attempts to prevent
inflation and keep down the cost of living and the cost of
the war program to the government as well as to prevent post-
war collapse, are secondary objectives ard are important only
insofar as they do not hinder the accomplishment of the prime
objective, to win the war. It was with these objectives in
mind that price control legislation was considered in the
United States.
Legislation and Application
Early in 1941 the EPACS, Emergency Price Administra-
tion and Supply Committee, was established by executive order.
It was recognized that control of prices and supplies was be-
coming necessary and that adequate machinery was needed. In-
asmuch as EPACS was instituted by executive order, its function
was purely advisory. Early orders of price control, selective
in nature, were promulgated by the administration and carried
out through fairly good cooperation by business. In the latter
part of 194-1, however, complaints and reports of violations
became numerous. It was evident that price administration
without legislative authority was impossible.
On January 31, 194-2, President Roosevelt signed the
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Emergency Price Control Act of 1942. This Act gave to the
price administration the powers of enforcement which were
lacking for many months after inception in 1941. There were
many restrictions, but, exclusive of these, the Act gave to the
price administrator powers, broad and sweeping enough to ad-
minister and enforce all regulations. The powers of enforce-
ment granted by the act are concerned with record requirements,
licensing and injunction, and treble damage suits.
Records: --By the wording of the Act the Administrator
is authorized "to require any person who is engaged in the
business of dealing with any commodity ... .to make and keep
records and other documents and to make reports."'1' He is
empowered to make studies and investigations and may serve
subpoenas and enforce the appearance and testimony of wit-
nesses and the production of documents. The records and
reports provisions gave to the administrator the powers to
gather information and to require maintenance of records,
without which price administration would be most difficult.
Licensing and Injunctions -The section of the act
pertaining to licensing was given much consideration and was
very carefully written. As finally passed these provisions
contain strong safeguards against any attempt to use these
powers for purposes other than intended. All businesses were
to be licensed, and the administrator would have to have some
1. Emergency Price Control Act of 1942. Sec. 202.
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control over these licenses to prevent violations. However,
it was felt that any provisions giving direct control would
be misused. License exclusions were therefore included for
farmers, radio and press. The administrator was not given
power to deny a license, 1 and more important he could not
suspend a license. Upon evidence of violation, he could only
issue warning and if this were disregarded and he had suf-
ficient proof, he could then petition the courts for a sus-
pension order for a period of no more than one year. This
actually permitted sanction of one sin without punishment.
Of all the enforcement powers conferred by the act
the most effective one is that which allowed injunction pro-
ceedings, Whenever a violation of a price regulation has been
committed or in the Judgment of the officials about to be
committed, the administrator may intervene by petitioning the
courts for an injunction. The possibility of obtaining an
injunction enables price control authorities to strike hard
and fast so that they do not lose the effect of their regula-
tions. It enables the administrator to stop any immediate
violations or to prevent even first attempts.
Treble Damage Suits: —The provisions for treble
damage suits give to price authorities the means of enlisting
the support of the public in their attempt to enforce price
regulations. Persons who bought commodities at prices over
1. If a person already had one suspension the administrator
could deny reinstatement.
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the maximum set by applicable regulations were given the right
to sue the seller for fifty dollars or treble the amount by
which the price exceeded the maximum, plus all legal and court
fees and other costs. The attempt was thereby made to enlist
the support of the public in policing regulations which were
Instituted to protect their interests. Such support is neces-
sary, but is workable only to the extent that those commodities
do not become extremely scarce; for in the latter event con-
sumers disregard their common interests and think only of their
personal ones. They would rather obtain goods in the black
market than insist on the legal price and be unable to obtain
the goods. The treble damage provision worked reasonably well
at the beginning, but it subsequently became necessary for the
Office of Price Administration to institute suits on its own
motion.
The Emergency Price Control Act provided the means
and power for effective price control, but it still had to be
decided what the nature of this control would be. Our previous
experience in price control was limited to World War I and
there were many who wanted to go back to this type of control.
All proposals made boiled down into a choice between two systems,
one the piecemeal system of the first war which fixed prices
selectively as control was needed, and the other, the overall
ceiling on all prices, wages, rents and other forms of remunera-
tion, which was first proposed in 1930 by Mr. Bernard Baruch,
former chairman of the War Industries Board of World War I.
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The latter system is Important in that it was of American origin,
but successfully applied by Adolph Hitler, Mr, Baruch, when he
proposed the plan, was dissatisfied with the selective price
fixing of 1917-!S. As he said,
“The fixing of individual prices at a time when the
whole of the rest of the structure is moving upward would be
both unjust and confiscatory. In a normal peace-time pattern
every price is a resultant of the combination of all other
prices,,, It is evident that we should neither stabilize
every price or stabilize no price,
“The theory of fixing individual prices in a period
of general inflation is unsound, because at the moment you fix
a price under such conditions, all its components are at the
same time rising and that price becomes immediately out of
date. ...They (Price Fixing Committee of War Industries Board)
discovered that what they were actually striving for was a
stabilized, homogeneous price schedule, the very thing that
exists at the beginning of most wars. Why, therefore, in any
future emergency should we not attempt to capture this while
it still exists, at the beginning of the war? To capture it
piecemeal later is actually arithmetically impossible. 1,1
He proposed to prohibit any changes in prices, wages, rents,
and interest rates by an overall celling which would ceil
these factors as they existed on a particular day. He
emphasized the need for immediate action with the approach of
the emergency conditions.
The General Maximum Price Regulation
In the discussion preceding passage of EPCA the
Baruch plan was rejected by Congress, Yet three months later
the idea was taken up and inaugurated by the Office of Price
1. Baruch, Bernard M., PRIORITIES, THE SYNCHRONIZING FORCE,
Harvard Business Review 19, no, 3 : 267-70 * > Spring, 19^1 •
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Administration through the medium of powers obtained under that
act* The order instituting this program was the General
Maximum Price Regulation of April 28, 19^2, more commonly
known as "General Max" *^
"General Max" froze prices of goods and services
generally at the retail, wholesale and manufacturing levels,
at the highest price which the seller delivered or offered
them in March 19^2. It provided for the continuance of the
same customary discounts and differentials ordinarily given to
different classes of customers, and the same prices for the
same or similar commodities and services as existed in March
19^2* For those services and commodities in which the seller
did not deal in March 19^2, the highest price was determined
by ascertaining the price of a similar commodity or service
most nearly like the intended one from the most closely compe-
titive seller of the same class* Provision was made for
licensing all wholesalers and retailers and special reporting
obligations were established for retailers. The regulation
was Intended as an overall price freezing and, within the
limits set by the EMPCA, it accomplished that purpose. There
were, however, several exceptions which subsequently made the
regulation inadequate. They are as follows.
1. Under the EPCA there were prescribed four levels
1. Published in the Federal Register as Title 32, Chapter XI,
Part 1500, Sections I500.l-i500.25.
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the highest of which had to be met before control could be
applied to agricultural products. This high level was not
reached until approximately October 19^2 and allowed these
products to increase without control until that time.
2. There were no provisions for freezing wages and
salaries.
3. Armaments and military supplies sold to the
government or to federal procurement agencies were excluded
from price control.
4. Also excluded according to EPCA were books,
magazines, motion pictures, advertising and public utility
rates.
5* There were exemptions for special institution.
Hotels, restaurants, bars, and similar establishments were
exempted on goods prepared and distributed on their own
premises.
These exclusions from the order left the gate open for in-
creased prices in their respective fields. Cost is not a
single element, but made up of the sum of other costs. If
overall freezing were to be successful there had to be freezing
of all costs. To the extent that all costs were not frozen
there were forces at work pushing up costs and eventually a
squeeze had to result.
The main reason for the issuance of the regulation,
aside from the growing impossibility of administering selective
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price control, was threatening wage Increases. Wage increases
were based on the argument that costs of living were rising
and, a freezing of those costs was the only way to refute that
argument. However, it was impossible to freeze costs unless
labor itself was frozen for labor is a cost in "cost of living
commodities 11 and unless it were kept down costs had to rise.
Under "General Max" control of labor costs and agricultural
prices were major exclusions. There, therefore, had to be a
gradual rolling forward of prices to meet Increased costs if a
squeeze were to be averted. If this were not done those pro-
ducers adhering strictly to the regulation would have to retire
or, as happened in many lines, there would be gradual evasion
either through production manipulation or quality deteriora-
tion, making enforcement impossible.
That such a situation was bound to develop was
recognized within a very short period of time. To correct
this and to bring about a closer coordination of activities in
the war effort, the Economic Stabilization Act of October 19^2,
was passed. The title to the Act reads "To ammend the Emergenc
Price Control Act of 19^2, to aid in preventing inflation, and
for other purposes." The Act strengthened the machinery of
price control by authorizing freezings of wages and agricultur-
al products. Under powers granted to the President the Office
of Economic Stabilization was established. The Director,
James F. Byrnes, was appointed by the President and ordered
"to formulate and develop a comprehensive national economic
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policy relating to control of civilian purchasing power, prices,
rents, wages, salaries, profits, rationing, subsidies, and all
related matters." He was in effect given control over all war
agencies whose activities had bearing on the above factors.
At the same time the President took action under the
Act to stabilize wages, salaries, farm prices, and rents. He
forbade wage rate increases above the level of September 15 ,
1942,^ Control of all wages and salaries was given to the War
Labor Board and it became the duty of the Board to maintain
this level unless it found increases necessary "to correct
maladjustments or inequalities, or to aid in effective prose-
cution of the war ." 2 Where such increases were likely to cause
increase in price, approval of the Office of Economic Stabiliza-
tion was required. Agricultural prices were also fixed at the
level prescribed in the Act. Margins of distributors and
processors were limited to those in existence in September,
19^2. At the retail wholesale and processing level prices were
fixed at the scale existing in October, 19^2. For those farm
products which had not reached the prescribed parity level
nothing could be done. Retail costs, however, for these
products were kept at the October level and when they did rise
the difference was equalized by the payment of subsidies to the
1. This was the date level established by the Act. Sec. 4,
Sec. S, c.
2. The legal power of the War Labor Board was established by
the War Labor Disputes Act of 19^2 from which this wording
is taken. In the "Little Steel" case in July, 1942, the
Board promulgated the "Little Steel" formula which allowed
15# Increase over the level of Jan. 1941. It has maintained
this formula ever since.
.1 : .x l - ; vrlior
.
,
• u • . c. . v . ,
.
t .
•
:
:
.
' r.v .. >
w o :• •£( • :
...
-
. rJ
v -
•
i ..... ^ . i .;•
.
<
.,30 . . . J c > . • x C • r
.
,
C: v- j . i. . • ; • ; -iii l' i -.i
0 t -• : . . ; • .v C»i
9.«X: .. .. . iu; n .< - i.' Si u e>: Jc^Xck
.
f ... j
t
s ,
, t
,
I , ‘i :i JJ . v *1 3£ ’. :J w
123 .
processor under authority granted by the Soil Conservation Act
of 1933* Legislation had now made it possible for the President
to protect the consumer and the farmer. The need was very
great. The President’s edict to Congress in his Labor Day
speech of 19^2 will not be forgotten, "You do or I will,"
The legislation which provided for control of
agricultural and industrial prices also provided for rent
control. The war economy had caused great dislocation in this
field. The Increased purchasing power created by war activity
was manifested in a sharp increase in demand for residential
houses. The shifting of large numbers of laborers to shipyards
and industrial centers caused bottlenecks in those areas.
Civilian construction was completely discontinued because of the
need for army and vital defense housing. These conditions called
for action to prohibit excessive rent Increases, particularly
in the bottleneck areas, and also to provide new housing ac-
commodations where needed as quickly as possible. Steps along
these lines were taken before the passage of the EPCA. The
O.P,A, under its own motion organized Fair Rent Committees on
a voluntary basis. In 19^1, 210 of these were organized in 34
States. 1 This control was gradually extended to every commun-
ity, and it worked fairly well in those areas not drastically
effected by dislocations. The voluntary method did not suffice
to solve the real problems, so effective legislation was needed
1. First Quarterly Report of the OPA. p. 4*5.
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The EPCA provided this legislation. It allowed the
price administrator to define "defense rental areas" and gave
him the authority to stabilize or reduce rents in those areas.
The actual procedure for this was to be carried out by local
rent authorities, but if within sixty days after notification,
the situation had not been remedied the price administrator
could correct it by direct regulation or order. "Defense
rental areas" were also included in "General Max". The order
defined some 323 areas of this nature and disallowed increases
in excess of the rates prevailing in March 19^2. Rent freezes
were thereby extended to cover over two thirds of the population
of the United States.
Up to the present writing rent control has worked
fairly well. There are, however, certain exclusions from the
rent control machinery which may get out of hand. Business
property has not been Included in the control and there is the
llklihood that when civilian production is resumed on a grand
scale, business rents may increase rapidly. Also ceilings have
not been established for real estate transactions and some types
of property have really boomed. This is important inasmuch as
rental value is related to market value and when one is hi$i,
it acts as a force pushing under the other. This is borne out
by experience in the control of rents of summer property. The
value of this type of property has increased greatly and as a
result rent control is practically unenforceable. Beach
r
• ;
.
'
•
.,1 ; V
-; \ ’’ . i c ( j
1
- 'i t
t
'
• J ' . . r l
-
'on
,
c
'
.
.
V
,
• .
[ $ -
*
,
•
•
S ..
•
. I . 0
:
n« i\- "I;jnrq » -
3
•:
' j- o* 1 nvo •• v- ;j » c r
. :i; . . i •" 3 • nl s r J V
• ajarf Icntfnoo Srisi ^nl.a Jt'iw tfnoae'iq &rl3 oS oil
i
j r.i . „ O' • ;• r:.' : • ' . '• •• ' r. . « •-
• J j : w . >
.
<
.
.
•
•
•
-
.
'
.
to
z '' In \ n-'- 1 J* ' c: ‘:c ‘^\.J 1,:. :> v
.
125
>
>
property rents in areas adjacent to our coastal cities have in
many cases tripled their 19^1 levels.
By the end of 19^2 allover price control was well
established as a method in the United States. But no sooner
was it established than it became necessary to modify it and
gradually ssing away from it. Unfortunately, the allover
method was instituted at a time well into the upswing. It
was politically Impossible and in some cases militarily unwise
to clamp the lid on every single price. As we have already
seen, many factors were allowed to fluctuate upward after
"General Max” so that when the lid was finally put on it was
put on at different levels creating squeezes and inequities.
Costs in some fields were higher than in others. Margins of
markup were in some cases lower than existed previous to the
war. Added to this was the fact that government monetary
policies did not succeed in removing the inflationary gap.
Though credit requirements had been Imposed, taxes made higher
and savings programs instituted, government expenditures for
the war effort were so great that short of complete totalitar-
ianism, it was next to impossible to remove excess spending
power. Temptation on the part of producers and consumers to
disobey price control regulations was great. The situation
was such that allover price control as we had applied it could
not survive.
Price Control authorities recognized even before the
N
issuance of "General Max" that allover price control as pf a
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particular period would not work. The order was intended as
a stop-gap for the rapid increase that was taking place until
more specific methods could be developed. The fight was not
to freeze all prices as of a certain period and keep them
there. It was rather a hold the line effort, an attempt .to •
keep prices as low as possible for as long a time as possible,
allowing increases where necessary to make control work. To
this effect O.P.A. embarked a policy of price regulations for
each particular industry. As soon as possible a survey was
made of each field and orders promulgated. These new orders
as they came out superseded “General Max“ and any previous
orders. Gradually over a period of time orders were instituted
in almost every field so that today with the exception of a few
luxury items such as furs and Jewelry there are orders covering
everything.
It will be recalled that in World War I price fixing
was selective, price being determined by the bulk-line method,
which allowed the operation of between 30-90 percent of
producers. 1 For each particular, product a single price pre-
vailed. In contrast with this “General Max'1 allowed the highest
price which prevailed in March 19^2 and it did not necessarily
follow that this price was the same for all producers. On
the contrary there existed slight differences among different
producers and these were carried over in their celling prices.
1. See previous discussion p. 52
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A single price was the exception rather than the rule* The
specific orders Instituted after "General Max" also provided
for differences in price, hut instead of being tied to the
highest price in March l$W-2 they were based on costs existing
in a base period. The new method was similar to the fixed
price relationship in that prices were tied to a set of condi-
tions that existed in a previous period. However, the condi-
tions varied for each individual producer so that actually this
method amounted to a cost plus arrangement. It became neces-
sary for each producer to reconstruct his base period costs
and determine the price cost ratio for each product he produced.
These ratios were arranged in order of selling price on a chart
which served as a guide in pricing all future production*
Price rules were formulated which applied as near as possible
the price cost ratios which applied in the base period.
The use of the price chart in the cost plus method
brought many problems. The idea had been suggested during
World War I but the problems of cost determination and en-
forcement were so great that it was decided to avoid them. The
situation in World War II called for much stronger action and
it was recognized at an early date that this was the only fair
method of dealing with the problem. The only real question
which had to be answered was whether the problem of enforcement
would be greater than that which the results Justified,
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Price Fixing in the Wearing Apparel Field
In order to thoroughly understand the new method, it
is well that we see it in operation* I have selected for this
purpose the ready-to-wear field* This field is of particular
interest because the problems of control are exceedingly
difficult* The industry is made up of numerous units which
normally operate under conditions of keen competition* Eesides
price the elements of quality and style enter in the competitiv
picture. Costs vary greatly between producers in the same
area, and producers in different areas. The industry on the
whole is one which does not readily lend itself to control;
yet as we proceeded away from overall price control it became
one which needed control most sorely*
Wearing apparel was covered by the original April
overall freeze regulation. Prices were to remain at the
highest level charged ip March 194-2 with customary discounts
and differentials allowed to the same class of producers. In
the ready-to-wear field, however, there was an exception to
this* While seasonal goods were kept at the base period level,
fall and winter outerwear garments for women and children were
allowed to be priced in a manner which reflected increases in
material and labor costs, providing that the overall markup
did not exceed that charged in 194-1* This immediately allowed
a differential for those industries producing outerwear gar-
ments and to the extent that materials were available there
e
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was some shifting of production to these fields. This excep-
tion was however, incidental to the major exclusion of labor
freezing from the regulation. It was this latter exclusion
which made "General Max" so unworkable in the apparel field.
The provisions of "General Max" required that manu-
facturers when pricing a new product, determine the price
from similar products of the most closely competitive seller
of the same class. Many manufacturers used this as an out in
avoiding ceiling regulations. Whenever a new style was made,
they used this method of pricing, and while they may have
kept the same prices as in March 1942, they depreciated the
quality which was the same as increasing price. To live with-
in the letter of the regulation, they merely had to find from
a competitor a similarly depreciated article and use this as
basis of comparison. In this manner it was possible to ab-
sorb Increases in labor and materials and pass them on to the
consumer. Within a year after the April regulation had been
in effect there was a gradual depreciation of quality and
disappearance of low-price goods from the market. Materials
which formerly went into lower brackets were Jumped into the
next higher range. Prices on similar quality goods were two
and three times higher than existed even in the base period.
In the specific orders which followed "General Max"
OPA attempted to do away with quality depreciation by using the
cost plus method and the price chart. It became necessary for
manufacturers to determine according to a prearranged method
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the costs of all styles produced In the base period. Detailed
provisions in the different orders set forth those costs al-
lowed as direct and those allowed as indirect. The different
items produced were blocked off into categories and percentages
figured for each price line within the category. When these
were all determined they were arranged in a price chart which
the manufacturer used in pricing future production. In con-
junction with the price chart detailed cost record forms were
required for current production. What was done was to actually
install in every producing unit a detailed cost accounting
system whereby OPA could at a moments notice determine the
cost of a particular garment and see whether it was properly
priced and billed. The original work in making up price
charts was heavy. Many of the smaller manufacturers had no
regular cost records and those who did were reluctant to use
them feeling that they would get a better break by establishing
costs from scratch. However, after the preliminary work was
done, the new system did succeed in eliminating quality
depreciation to a very great extent. When the cost of a gar-
ment was established the manufacturer had now to turn to his
price chart and apply the proper markup ratio. He could not.
as he previously did, price the garment into the next higher
price range merely because he could get the price. Price and
quality were now established in a more compatible relationship
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Pricing Chart-*-
Cat egory
number
Selling
price lines
Terms Maximum
allowable
margin
Minimum
allowable
cost
36 $14.75 all terms 8/l0 46$ 7.97
13*75 Eom .Wholesalers 32$ 9.35
11*75 15$ off 32$ 7.99
10.75 32$ 7.31
32 9.75 41^ 5.75
8.75 hl% 5.16
7.75 20$ 6.20
3.75 Net 15$ 3.19
31 4.75 Net 41.3$ 2.79
5.75 Net, 3/l0 Eom
to chains 38.7$ 3.52
The above is an example of a price chart of a manu-
facturer of women's slacks and slack suits. He must use this
to determine his current prices* Three rules are provided for
price determination*
Rule 1. A manufacturer may sell in any selling
price line listed on the chart providing that selling line is
not higher than the highest listed* If he desires to sell at
a price listed on the chart, he must use the corresponding
minimum allowable cost or if his cost can be found directly
on the chart, he may use the corresponding selling price*
Rule 2. If his selling price or cost is lower than
that listed on the chart, he applies the average of the
1* Example taken from RMFR 287 Appendix B
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maximum allowable margins for all price lines within a
category.
Rule 3* If the selling line or cost is not directly
on the pricing chart, but lies between two selling lines, he
applies the lower of the two maximum allowable margins to
determine his new minimum allowable cost or selling price.
The preceeding example will give an idea of how the
price chart works. The pricing rules and methods of determin-
ing percentage markups are not the same in all the orders, but
the pattern is similar in all regulations, exceptions and
special provisions being made for each particular industry.
For some industries the percentage margins are figured on
selling price; for some on cost. The central idea is that for
every selling line it is possible to establish a reasonable
minimum allowable cost which the manufacturer must put into
his product unless he desires to lower the price in accord-
ance with a lower percentage margin. All costs must be in-
cluded in the current operation records and be verified by
bills so that it is practically impossible, if one lives up
to the regulations, to vary quality or raise price unwarrant-
edly
.
The general idea is now clear, but the numerous
problems make application very difficult. Provisions have to
be made for changes in production, for new manufacturers going
into business, for irregularities in different industries, and
relationships between industries. Orders must apply not only
*Oi.
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to the actual processor, but to the suppliers of trimmings,
embroideries, and other component part3 of the garment. Each
order mu3t be written so that it ties in with the entire
price control program and with related orders. Without going
into these many problems it will suffice to say that they have
been met satisfactorily as they have come up.
In the application of the specific orders a definite
pattern has been followed. These orders have been applied
first to the processors of raw materials, then to manufacturers,
and finally to retailers. In other words control was started
at the source of production and expanded gradually through
manufacturer, jobber and retailer. The reason for this is
obvious. Had control been imposed at any other level in the
line of production high costs from the preceeding suppliers
would have made it unworkable. In some Instances orders were
not promulgated quickly enough and rollbacks were necessary.
For example, MPR 570, controlling negligees and lingerie, was
imposed very late in the chronological schedule and therefore
carried a 15$ rollback in order to equalize markups. On the
whole, however, the control has been Instituted at one level
and maladjustments have been insignificant.
The cost plus method, while it has worked out
fairly well, is by no means perfect. One of the greatest
defects is that it does not control the level of production.
For example, if a manufacturer made during his base period
four price lines within a single category, the natural
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tendency will be for him to concentrate on hi 3 highest selling
line in that category now. Even though his percentage of
markup may be the same or even less, it will be to his advan-
tage to produce the highest price line he is permitted, for
his dollar margin will be greater at that level while his fixed
expense will be approximately the same. Referring to the
above price chart, we see that it will be more profitable to
produce the $5.75 line in category 31 than to produce the
$4,75 line even though the percentage markup is almost
less. The dollar margin is $2.23 against $1,96 or 27^ more at
approximately the same overhead cost. This tendency was very
widespread in the apparel field. It was perhaps the main
reason that low end merchandise did not appear after the
specific method went into effect. The specific orders had
succeeded in eliminating price increases in the form of
quality deterioration, but they did not return to counters
the low end goods which were previously so abundant.
The situation in the wearing apparel field became
very bad in the early part of 1945* As expressed in S.O. 108,
"inflation of distributive margins which is a by-
product of the shift to higher price lines, is expressed in the
higher dollar margin which comes to wholesalers and retailers
as a result of the fact that higher priced goods ordinarily
carry as high a percentage markup as lower priced goods, and
frequently a higher percentage markup. When most of the goods
suddenly become higher priced goods the distributor found him-
self receiving a substantially larger number of dollars of
margin from the average sale of an apparel item than he
formerly received. Since his costs per sale are up only
slightly, or in many cases actually decreased, his dollar pro-
fit has been suddenly greatly inflated." 1
1. Supplementary Order 108
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All manufacturers were working on their higher priced lines
and as a result low priced goods were not available. To meet
this situation OPA issued the M.A.P. or maximum average price
plan which forced production in the cheaper lines.
The device used was a fairly simple one and if
administered properly should be very effective in producing
the desired results. The base period selected was the entire
year 194-3. 1 Each manufacturer covered by the order must
determine the weighted average of his shipments of a particular
category during the base period and in his future operations
that weighted average becomes his maximum average price, that
is, the average of all future shipments in that category
cannot exceed the weighted average in the base period. For
example if ABC Company shipped in the first quarter of 194-3
100 units at $2.00, 200 units at $3*00 and 300 units at $4.00
his weighted average for that category is $3*33 obtained by
dividing $2000, the total volume, by 600, the total number of
units. In fhture operations in the corresponding quarter ABC
Co. cannot exceed the $3.33 average. If they do, they must
go into a makeup period and ship a sufficient number of cheap
units until the unit volume below the average has been made
up. Under existing regulations this makeup period can last no
longer than thirty days after which time, if the unit volume
1. The order permitted averages on a quarterly, semi-annually
or yearly basis at the option of the producer.
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hag not been made up, the maximum average price becomes the
ceiling price and shipments at higher prices ape disallowed.
)
Ey this device it becomes possible to force production in
customary price lines*
M*A.P* went into effect June 1, 194-5. It was subject
i
to serious setback at the start in that it was applied at the
manufacturing level and not at the raw material level. Severe
criticism was made by manufacturers who felt that they could
not produce cheaper items unless cheaper materials were made
available. To a large measure their criticisms were Justified
and OPA has taken steps to remedy this defect. The only real
criticism of M.A.P. is that it can work hardship on those
producers in critical labor areas who have had a cut in their
employment factor since 1943. To produce cheaper goods greater
unit production is necessary, and in those instances where
severe labor drops have been encountered hardships may result.
If discretion is used at the proper time, the order can be
workable. That results will be accomplished is attested by
that fact that cheap goods, disappeared for so long, are
reappearing, this in the few weeks that the order has been
in effect.
Another device which has been used to good advantage
is the preticketing device. In certain lines, particularly
the cotton goods lines it was found that extreme scarcity had
brought about highly Inflated prices. The OPA in conjunction
with WPB issued MPR 578 which required that manufacturers pre-
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ticket each garment with the retail price. Fixed percentages
of markup were determined for the retailer and detailed charts
by which the manufacturer could figure the retail price were
provided. The markups established for wholesalers range from
17 to 20 percent on selling price while the markups for
retailers range from thirty to thirty-five percent. These
markups are lower than what customarily prevailed, but they
were justified in that "the demand is great, the cost of
selling is reduced, and the risk of markdown s and returns is
negligable
,
h1 The most desirable feature of the pre-ticketing
device is that it prevents pyramiding of markups through
"cross- stream and up-stream" sales; i.e., sales outside of the
regular channels of distribution. The ceiling price is
established at the manufacturing level and must apply regard-
less of the number of middlemen who handle the product.
The above devices serve to briefly outline the
method of control in the apparel field. The apparel field is
only one of the many fields of control which concern OPA. It
is, however, one of the most difficult, and while mistakes
have been made the general picture is commendable. Control of
ready to wear apparel is rapidly taking effect. The new de-
vices have brought about the desired results.
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• CHAPTER VIII
CONCLUSIONS
In the previous chapters we have examined the history
of price control, analyzed it objectively, and observed its
operation in the war economy. The field, of course, is very
expansive and in a survey of this nature it is only possible
to scratch the surface of each individual phase. However, it
has been possible to get a comprehensive picture of the field
and from this certain generalizations can be drawn.
In the introduction we stated as opinion that
price control was no cure-all, but that it did have value and
could be made to work. After covering the preceeding material,
this statement should have real meaning. Price control is
complicated. Adequate results depend on many factors other
than economic ones, but the important thing to note is that
with intelligent planning and administration, it can be made
an effective tool for government action. The past record has
not been good, but this may be attributed more to lack of
planning and experience than to inherent defects in the
theory. The interrelationship of prices, the complexities
of the economic system, make administration difficult, but
these by no means preclude possibility of success. In the
recent emergency we have seen a situation where price control
was not only desirable but necessary, and under this stimulus.
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proper study and preparation were made and price control did
succeed. It is not intended that price control be prescribed
as the medicine for every economic disease. However, under
certain conditions it is a valuable tool# Unfortunately, it
bears the stigma of its past failures, but the success in the
/
present emergency may remove a large measure of the opposition.
From our discussion it is possible to describe two
broad situations in which price control may be used. It may
be used during a depression to mitigate the bad effects or it
may be used in an upswing to avoid the serious consequences
of inflation and subsequent collapse. Controls of the first
group usually take the form of valorizations, government
agreements, etc., and, as previously stated, are carried out
in a seller’s emergency. The problem in such instance is to
prevent declining prices and hence raise prices to a level
high enough to enable the sellers to break even. Unfortunately
most of these schemes have met failure. In valorizations,
producers have become antagonistic to the programs even though
they have been carried out for their benefit. When prices have
risen they are not satisfied that they can operate profitably,
but rather oppose any form of surplus liquidation in the hopes
of benefiting by a sharp rise in price due to short supply.
In intergovernment agreement complete control of supply is
not usually achieved, or when it is ^nationalistic envy of one
nation for another has usually resulted in failure. These
failures can be attributed to a short sighted attitude on the
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part of the participants. By no means do they prophesy that
all future experiments will have the same results. If adminis-
tered properly with the proper spirit behind them at the start,
they should have a fair chance of success. The idea of a
completely free system of prices, devoid of any control has
definitely gone by the way. To say that during depression
government interference in the price system will not work is
not only untrue but inhuman. Certain measures are necessary
to ease the hardships of depression and if in a given situa-
tion it is decided that price control may help, there should
be no hesitation on that account. On a purely economic basis
such control can succeed. The real problems lie outside the
realm of economics.
Price control in the period of upswing is of com-
paratively recent origin. Under the present war conditions
it has been used with fairly good results. In their efforts at
keeping prices down, and distributing fairly, available sup-
plies in accordance with standards other than monetary ability
to buy, nations have been able to hold off, if not avert, the
horrible effects of inflation. While success has been appar-
ent during the war period the real test will come in the post-
war era when the patriotic stimulus is removed. It is para-
doxical that under the stimulus of war when one problem
mounts on top of the other, economic considerations which
make control successful hold sway, yet in peace when problems
of administration would be so insignificant by comparison.
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economic considerations are entirely disregarded. If price
control is thrown out suddenly and we are left to the mercy
of uncontrolled prices, inflation cannot be avoided. If, how-
ever, the change is made gradually, and controls are relaxed
. as goods become available, we stand a good chance of averting
the evils of inflation. Here also we find that the success
of price control depends on considerations other than economic
ones. It is possible to determine by economic analysis
what should be done in a given situation, but to carry this
out effectively is a problem which also lies beyond the power
of economics. It is a problem in administrative government.
In a dictatorship it must be handled by the dictator; in a
democracy it must be decided by the people and effectively
administered by agency of the people.
It can be stated, then, that price control from a
purely economic point of view can be imposed on the price
system and be made to work. Just as it is possible for
monopoly to interfere with the workings of free prices, so
is it possible for governments to interfere to achieve their
own results. The difficulties may be very much greater, but
they can be achieved. Price control is difficult; it is
complicated; but in view of recent trends in government, it is
a device which is bound to be us ed more and more, and if
properly carried out, it can be used as an effective tool by
governments for the benefit of their people*
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ABSTRACT
Price control as a tool for government intervention
has been very much on the increase in the past decade. Inas-
much as the subject is so vital, particularly today in the
war economy, it is wise to study it, examine its drawbacks and
potentialities, and evaluate it critically, so that we may
determine its effectiveness as gm instrumentality of govern-
ments •
The idea is not a new one. Examples are found in
the Code of Hammurabi, King of Babylon, In the Mosaic and
Brahminic there are also examples, Plato, Aristotle, Xenophon,
and other G-reek writers discussed the subject in one form or
another. Strong traces of the idea are to be found in the
writings of the Church fathers during the Middle Ages. Indeed
at the height of the power of the Church, regulation of
economic life was the dominant theme inasmuch as it was a
means to a more perfect spiritual life. This theme extended
through the Mercantilistic period down to the industrial
revolution, when under the influence of the writings of Adam
Smith, the idea was discarded in favor of a policy of laissez-
faire. With the dawn of the twentieth century control of
economic life by governments was again taken up and has since
been utilized in an increasing number of instances. Early
experience in the present era of price control was not too
successful. Valorizations and International Control Schemes
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for the most part have been ineffective. In this country the
N.R.A. failed miserably to achieve the purposes for which it
was undertaken. In spite of these failures, price control
has not been discarded. Under the stress of political and
economic conditions it is being used more than ever before#
In the present emergency it has been a must, and although it
has taken a war to bring about wise application, it has been
shown that by careful planning and administration, price
control can be utilized to bring about desired results.
Obstacles to effective price control are numerous.
In the past failures have been attributed to faulty economic
reasoning. In many instances this has been true, but for
the most part failures may be attributed to factors other
than economic ones, particularly social and political factors.
Within the past decade there has been intensive study of the
theory and problems, so that there now exists a thorough
understanding of the use and limitations of the device. From
a purely economic view price control 3hould work with a
reasonable effectiveness. Unfortunately the political factors
more often present insurmountable obstacles. Pressure groups
with enormous power are able to sway government officials and
bring about easing of controls for their own benefit. Easing
of one control brings about easing of others until we have a
gradual deterioration of the program. The fact that political
considerations are readily placed before economic ones indi-
cates that the force motivating government officials must be
I.
. . .
»
"
'
' ...
.
.
.
nssd GHrf rfi «rt
.
-
.
erf c • f , i L i
,
VftJ ' !"
.
n ; ep! ;'n *. f: )d e r <yxarfd e'^o^b rf. ...q ~iS • trfJJt *
. aII kn£ 9BU &i 4J 1c
r£: 'tirj &
.
.
rfner.rr.'ve \&v. nidi.1- e* & t.toc p : or". ns :$: <
j e;v.. sir s*i>ff^o !o ~ ,J; odn e? nJtrtcf Icn.tnoo ©no 'o
.
144
a strong one Indeed if price control is to succeed.
In the present emergency war has presented the
necessary motivating force and political considerations have
been put aside so that effective control has been possible.
If this effective control is maintained in the post-war period,
there is a reasonably good chance to avoid the evils of in-
flation. Unfortunately, however, indications are that once
the war is over the necessary motivating force will not be
present and political considerations will once again hold
sway. To the extent that this trend continues to materialize
our chances of avoiding inflation are so much the less. It
is to be stressed, therefore, that any failure of the price
control program is due not to any inherent defect in the
program itself, but rather to factors outside of the program.
Price control can be an effective instrument of government,
but if it is to be subject to political footballing, there is
little opportunity for it to succeed.
Rapid strides have been made in the present emergency
in price control technique. Although we did not adopt the
piecemeal system of World War I^we have a system vaguely simi-
lar to it. One might call it an integrated system of control.
Starting from the allover control of "General Max" we finally
evolved regulations for every industry in which they were
needed. The general pattern of these regulations was the
same, most of them utilizing the price chart device. These
regulations, however, were basic. They were supplemented from
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time to time as conditions demanded by other regulations which
in certain provisions superseded the basic ones, MAP for
example, was intended as a supplement to certain specific
orders. In some respects its provisions work contrary to the
specific orders, but where this holds true MAP usually super-
sedes, In any advent it is required that both orders be
adhered to. The new technique has made possible an allover
system of price control, containing specific orders for each
industry and yet retaining a high degree of integration and
coordination
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